Am I the Only Person Paying Taxes?  The Largest Tax Loophole for the Rich - Exchange Funds by Herzig, David J.
Valparaiso University
ValpoScholar
Law Faculty Publications Law Faculty Presentations and Publications
2009
Am I the Only Person Paying Taxes? The Largest
Tax Loophole for the Rich - Exchange Funds
David J. Herzig
Valparaiso University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.valpo.edu/law_fac_pubs
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons, and the Taxation-Federal Income Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Faculty Presentations and Publications at ValpoScholar. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a ValpoScholar staff
member at scholar@valpo.edu.
Recommended Citation
David J. Herzig, Am I the Only Person Paying Taxes? The Largest Tax Loophole for the Rich - Exchange Funds, 2009 Mich. St. L. Rev. 503.
AM I THE ONLY PERSON PAYING TAXES?: THE 
LARGEST TAX LOOPHOLE FOR THE RICH ⎯ 
EXCHANGE FUNDS 
David J. Herzig∗ 
2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 503 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................. 503 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 504 
I.   ACCUMULATED ADVANTAGE .............................................................. 507 
II. EXCHANGE FUND BASICS .................................................................... 510 
III. TRADITIONAL FUND STRUCTURE ........................................................ 514 
IV. TAX HISTORY OF EXCHANGE FUNDS .................................................. 518 
A. Pre-1966 Section 351(a) .............................................................. 519 
B. Foreign Investor’s Act of 1966 and 1967 Regulations ................ 521 
C. 1976 Legislation Addressing Partnership—New Section 721 .... 523 
D. 1980 Proposed Regulations ......................................................... 525 
E. 1996 Regulations ......................................................................... 525 
F. Amendment of 351(e) in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 ......... 526 
V. TAX ANALYSIS ..................................................................................... 528 
A. Financial Instruments and the 80-20 Rule ................................... 528 
B. Timing of Investment Company Status ....................................... 531 
C. Tax Avoidance ............................................................................. 532 
VI. ADDITIONAL BENEFITS ........................................................................ 538 
A. Estate Planning ............................................................................ 538 
B. Borrowing Against the Fund ....................................................... 539 
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 540 
ABSTRACT 
 
President Obama is faced with a national debt at over $11 trillion and 
needs to fund projects such as National Health Care with an ever-shrinking 
tax base.  As the economy has slowed, so have tax revenues.  It would then 
  
 ∗ Professor David J. Herzig (University of Louisville B.A., 1993; University of 
Kentucky School of Law, J.D., 1997) is an Assistant Professor of Law at Valparaiso Univer-
sity School of Law.  Professor Herzig would like to thank Belinda Herzig, Esq. for her help 
in the research and revision of the Article.  Further, a thank you is due for Professor Jerome 
M. Hesch for his comments and the staff of the Michigan State Law Review for their hard 
work in completing the editing of the Article.  
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make sense for the government to reexamine tax carve-outs that only benefit 
the wealthy.  In fact, President Obama is on record saying he wants to elim-
inate tax loopholes.  After almost fifty years, the time is ripe to eliminate 
one of the few congressionally authorized tax loopholes—the $30 billion 
Exchange Funds. 
This Article addresses the social equity arguments and the tax and 
economic theories to solve the perceived problem.  The Article thoroughly 
covers, through unique access to materials not available in traditional legal 
sources, including fund private placement memorandum, the basics of fund 
details, fund formations, and the tax rules, and suggests solutions to solve 
the social inequity. 
This Article not only proposes how to create legislation to tax the cur-
rent arrangements but offers a solution utilizing the Code and Regulations to 
tax these vehicles. 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the longest periods of unchecked corporate and individual 
greed and excess has just ended.1  The result of that greed is that our econ-
omy has gone through a recession.2  During this past cycle, there has been a 
focus on the evils done by “Wall Street” to “Main Street” Americans.3  
  
 1. See generally Landon Thomas, Jr., Rich Britons, Offshore and Lightly Taxed, 
But Maybe Not Forever, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2009, at B1 (“[M]uch as Stephen A. Schwarz-
man, the chairman of the Blackstone Group, epitomized Wall Street’s own era of excess.”); 
Philipp Meyer, American Excess: A Wall Street Trader Tells All, INDEP. (U.K.), Apr. 27, 
2009, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/american-excess--a-
wall-street-trader-tells-all-1674614.html; Dana Milbank, Auto Execs Fly Corporate Jets to 
D.C., Tin Cups in Hand, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2008, at A3 (“Instead, the chief executives of 
the Big Three automakers opted to fly their company jets to the capital for their hearings this 
week before the Senate and House—an ill-timed display of corporate excess for a trio of 
executives begging for an additional $25 billion from the public trough this week.”); James 
Grant, Op-Ed., The Fed’s Subprime Solution, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2007, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/ 2007/08/26/opinion/26grant.html. 
 2. See generally Robert Creamer, AIG Bonus Scandal Spotlights the Bankruptcy of 
Wall Street’s “Greed is Good” Values, HUFFINGTON POST, Mar. 15, 2009, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-creamer/aig-bonus-scandal-spotlig_b_175124.html 
(“In 1987 Michael Douglas starred in a film called Wall Street where he famously intoned: 
‘Greed is good.’  That has been the motto of the American financial sector for the last thirty 
years—and it became the accepted moral frame for much of American economic and politi-
cal dialogue—culminating in the ‘markets uber alles’ philosophy of the Bush years.”); Nou-
riel Roubini, Op-Ed., A Global Breakdown of the Recession in 2009, FORBES, Jan. 15, 2009, 
available at http://www.forbes.com/2009/01/14/global-recession-2009-oped-cx_nr_0115 
roubini.html.  
 3. Although the current economic crisis has encompassed the collapse of many 
institutions, such as Lehman Brothers, and required an unprecedented governmental bail-out 
of others, the focus of the corporate greed has been directed at AIG.  From the bonuses paid 
after the receipt of governmental bail-out money to the lavish corporate outings, AIG has 
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What has been shown is that there are bundles of benefits or “accumulative 
advantage[s]”4 that exist for the wealthy that do not exist for the “average 
American” and that do not benefit the greater good.  The tax code not only 
promotes these advantages, but also helped to fuel the over-consumption 
that led to the recent economic downturn.5   
There can be no better example of unnecessary benefit without a co-
rollary purpose than “exchange or swap funds.”6  An exchange or swap fund 
  
been a microcosm of the frustration.  For information on the collapse of Lehman and other 
financials, see Graeme Wearden, David Teather, & Jill Treanor, Banking Crisis: Lehman 
Brothers Files for Bankruptcy Protection, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 15, 2008, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/sep/15/lehmanbrothers.creditcrunch; Andrew Ross 
Sorkin, Lehman Files for Bankruptcy; Merrill Is Sold, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2008, at B1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/business/15lehman.html?pagewanted=all.   
For information on bail-out money to U.S. companies, see Joseph R. Szczesny, The 
Auto Bailout Keeps Growing, and Growing, TIME, Jan. 14, 2009, available at 
http://www.time. com/time/business/article/0,8599,1871519,00.html; Peter Whoriskey, Un-
der Restructuring, GM to Build More Cars Overseas, WASH. POST, May 8, 2009, at A1. 
For information on the AIG corporate outing, see Andrew Taylor, AIG Execs’ Retreat After 
Bailout Angers Lawmakers, USA TODAY, Oct. 7, 2008, available at 
http://usatoday.com/money/economy/2008-10-07-3811831325_x.htm; AIG, Spa, CHI. TRIB., 
Oct. 8, 2008, available at http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/chi-aig-spa-081008-
ht,0,460884. story.  
For information on AIG bonuses, see Brady Dennis & David Cho, Rage at AIG 
Swells as Bonuses Go Out: Fed Decided Payouts Couldn’t Be Stopped, WASH. POST, Mar. 
17, 2009, at A1; Jonathan Weisman, Sudeep Reddy & Liam Pleven, Political Heat Sears 
AIG: Obama Vows to Block Bonuses, But It May Be Too Late; Firm Pressured to Repay 
U.S., WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2009, at A1. 
 4. MALCOLM GLADWELL, OUTLIERS: THE STORY OF SUCCESS 30 (2008). 
 5. See Fareed Zakaria, Worthwhile Canadian Initiative, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 16, 2009, 
at 31, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/183670. 
 6. See David Cay Johnston, A Tax Break for the Rich Who Can Keep a Secret, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2002, at C1, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html? 
res=9E05E2DC1631F933A2575AC0A9649C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=1.  Ex-
change Funds used to be open to anyone.  However, through the amendments, Congress has 
limited the investment to qualified investors, specifically, those investors with over 
$5,000,000 net worth.  Id. 
To meet the 1997 requirements, the operators of exchange funds must form 
partnerships that are not offered to the general public, only to qualified purchasers.  
Other tax and S.E.C. rules require that the partnerships be treated as private place-
ments, rather than a public offering to investors, so no advertising is allowed and 
prospective investors must sign confidentiality agreements. 
Why limit qualified purchasers to people with $5 million in stocks and bonds?  
The rationale is that exchange funds are considered suitable only for people who 
do not need to touch the money for 7 to 15 years[—]in short, only for people weal-
thy enough to afford the risk of such a long-term investment.  A lot of early with-
drawals make the fund unmanageable. 
Id.  
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enables investors with over $5 million net worth7 and a large block of a sin-
gle stock position (most often with a $1 million minimum value), to diversi-
fy the position without recognizing gain.8  These exchange or swap funds 
are available to the rich—not just the super rich.9  “Fewer than one in 1,900 
Americans qualify for exchange funds according to current rules, said Pro-
fessor Edward Wolff, a New York University expert on wealth.”10 
President Obama is on record stating his administration’s position to 
crackdown on tax loopholes.11  A logical target would be a $30 billion tax 
loophole.  Currently, budget estimates are at $3.55 trillion12 and the national 
debt is over $12 trillion.13  The time is ripe to examine all tax loopholes—
especially the $30 billion exchange fund tax break.14 
  
 7. A shareholder must at the time of the purchase, be a “qualified purchaser” as 
defined in Section 2(a)(51)(A) of the 1940 Act and rules thereunder.  15 U.S.C. § 80a-
2(a)(51)(A) (2006). 
 8. See Lee Sheppard, Ruby Slippers: Combating Tax-Free Formations of Invest-
ment Companies, 84 TAX NOTES 1699, 1699 (1999) [hereinafter Sheppard, Ruby Slippers].  
See also Marvin A. Chirelstein, Tax Pooling and Postponement – The Capital Exchange 
Funds, 75 YALE L.J. 183 (1965). 
 9. See Sheppard, Ruby Slippers, supra note 8, at 1699 (“An investor has to have 
$10 million worth of shares to even talk to an investment bank about an equity swap.  An 
investor need only have $1 million in shares to contribute to a swap fund.  Swap funds are 
sold as private placements to small numbers of investors each of whose total assets exceed 
$5 million.  Swap funds, therefore, are for mere millionaires, rather than multimillionaires.”). 
 10. Johnston, supra note 6. 
 11. See Obama for America, Barack Obama’s Comprehensive Tax Plan, 
http://www.barackobama.com/pdf/taxes/Factsheet_Tax_Plan_FINAL.pdf (“Our tax code is 
riddled with special interest loopholes that allow some corporations and wealthy individuals 
to avoid paying their fair share of taxes.”).  See also Kenneth R. Bazinet, President Obama 
Takes Aim at Tax Loopholes, Offshore Tax Shelters, May 5, 2009, http://www.nydailynews. 
com/news/politics/2009/05/04/2009-05-04_obama_announces_plan_to_close_tax_loopholes 
_.html; Lynnley Browning, Obama Plan Leaves One Path to Lower Taxes Wide Open, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 5, 2009, at A3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/05/business/ 
05shelter.html. 
 12. Roger Runningen & Hans Nichols, Obama Says U.S. Long-Term Debt Load 
‘Unsustainable’ (Update2), BLOOMBERG.COM, May 14, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
apps/news?sid=abXWfVxx_e8w&pid=20603037 (“The White House Office of Management 
and Budget also projected next year’s budget will end up at $3.59 trillion, compared with the 
$3.55 trillion it estimated previously.”). 
 13. See Lori Montgomery, Deficit Projected To Swell Beyond Earlier Estimates: 
CBO Expects Trillions More in Borrowing, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 2009, at A01, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/20/AR2009032001820. 
html?hpid=topnews; U.S. National Debt Clock, http://www.usdebtclock.org/ (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2010).  
 14. See Montgomery, supra note 13 (“Tax collections, meanwhile, would lag well 
behind spending, producing huge annual budget deficits that would force the nation to bor-
row nearly $9.3 trillion over the next decade—$2.3 trillion more than the president predicted 
when he unveiled his budget request just one month ago.”); Shira J. Boss, Another Twist for 
Exchange Fund Loophole, FORBES, Mar. 20, 2001, http://www.forbes.com/2001/03/20/ 
0320finance.html (“‘The [proposed] legislation rarely says, “There will be no more exchange 
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I.  ACCUMULATED ADVANTAGE 
The problem facing President Obama in his stated policy of eliminat-
ing tax loopholes is twofold.  First, Congress has a long history of passing 
tax benefits without looking back to determine the applied effects of those 
benefits.  Second, the modification to existing tax policy is typically reac-
tionary and piecemeal; it is unable to keep up with the technology available 
in the financial products marketplace. 
It is those who are successful, in other words, who are most likely to be given the 
kinds of special opportunities that lead to further success.  It’s the rich who get the 
biggest tax breaks.  It’s the best students who get the best teaching and most atten-
tion.  And it’s the biggest nine- and ten-year-olds who get the most coaching and 
practice.  Success is the result of what sociologists like to call “accumulative ad-
vantage.”15  
There are many who feel that our tax policy tends to promote this ac-
cumulated advantage by giving as many tax breaks or incentives to the 
wealthy as possible.16  The policy generally is to encourage investment in an 
  
funds,” Dowdall points out.  “Instead you get amendments, or changes in the language or the 
definitions or the exceptions [that could effectively eliminate them].”’”). 
 15. GLADWELL, supra note 4, at 30.  
 16. See Johnston, supra note 6 (“It’s all perfectly legal[—]but only if you have $5 
million of stocks and bonds.  And only if you promise to keep it secret.  It’s one example of 
how the tax laws currently grant certain favors only to the very wealthiest.”).  For example, 
among other items, capital gains are taxed at lower rates than ordinary income.  See, e.g., 
JOEL FRIEDMAN & KATHERINE RICHARDS, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, CAPITAL 
GAINS AND DIVIDEND TAX CUTS: DATA MAKE CLEAR THAT HIGH-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS 
BENEFIT THE MOST 2 (2006), http://www.cbpp.org/files/1-30-06tax2.pdf (“[O]nly [an esti-
mated] 17 percent of households in the bottom 60 percent of the income spectrum own 
[some] stock in taxable accounts” while “73 percent of the households in the top 10 percent 
of the income spectrum own stock” and the “top one percent owns 29 percent of all taxable 
stock.”).  Home interest is deductible.  See Zakaria, supra note 5 (“[T]he Canadian tax code 
does not provide the massive incentive for overconsumption that the U.S. code does: interest 
on your mortgage isn’t deductible up north.”).  Tax-free exchanges of commercial property 
are permitted under § 1031.  See Terry Pristin, Commercial Real Estate; Money Flowing to 
New Way to Pool Buyers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2004, at C10, available at 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D06E6D61239F931A1575AC0A9629C8B
63 (“Under § 1031 of the federal tax code, such taxes can be deferred if the property being 
sold is exchanged for one of the same value.  But the seller has to find a new property within 
45 days and complete the exchange within 135 days after that—a deadline that sponsors say 
is often hard to meet, particularly in a hot real estate market.”); Federation of Exchange 
Accommodators, Professional Trade Association for Qualified Intermediaries Under IRC § 
1031: FAQs, http://www.1031.org/about1031/faq.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (“The 
theory behind Section 1031 is that when a property owner has reinvested the sale proceeds 
into another property, the economic gain has not been realized in a way that generates funds 
to pay any tax.  In other words, the taxpayer’s investment is still the same, only the form has 
changed (e.g. vacant land exchanged for apartment building).  Therefore, it would be unfair 
to force the taxpayer to pay tax on a ‘paper’ gain.”).  
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area that Congress deems to be beneficial.17  It is accepted that tax policy 
that favors an investor class or a corporation is permissible because it bene-
fits the greater economic good.  One such advantage granted is the tax-free 
diversification commonly called exchange or swap funds, which was never 
enacted with the purpose of benefiting the greater economic good.18 
Even if there is a greater economic good, it has been eloquently ar-
gued numerous times that providing this accumulated advantage through the 
tax code does not provide a greater good.19  One problem in analyzing tax 
policy is the lack of follow-up research to determine whether or not the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (Code), is accomplishing its 
stated goals.20  Often, it is the initial stated assumption that rules the day.21  
For example, the assumption with capital gains tax is that it will encourage 
investment by middle-class Americans even though this has been proven 
untrue.22  More often than not, the applied results will greatly diverge.23 
  
 17. For example, “clarinet and music lessons” are deductible.  See Linda Stern, 
Deduction Redux: Six Tax Breaks You’ve Probably Never Heard Of, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 7, 
2009, http://www.newsweek.com/id/192900?from=rss. 
 18. Generally, in a swap or exchange fund a single stock position is contributed to a 
partnership with other single stock positions.  At the end of a term the contributor receives 
back a diversified portfolio of positions.  See Johnston, supra note 6; Boss, supra note 14.  
This Article does not address the reporting rules under Rule 144, Section 16 or 13(d) of the 
Exchange Act.  The funds leave it up to the shareholder whether this constitutes a disposal 
worth reporting on schedule 13D or 13G filings.  See Beldore Capital Fund LLC, SUMMARY 
OF THE TERMS OF THE OFFERING 54 (2007) [hereinafter Beldore]. 
 19. See, for example, discussions centered around the home interest deduction for a 
home owner’s mortgage.  In a recent article by Mr. Fareed Zakaria in Newsweek, he posited 
that there is no actual correlation between the tax benefit and home ownership.  He compared 
Canada’s taxing system to the United States regarding home interest deductibility.  In Cana-
da, interest is not deductible while it is in the United States.  Zakaria, supra note 5 (“Ah, but 
you’ve heard American politicians wax eloquent on the need for these expensive programs—
interest deductibility alone costs the federal government $100 billion a year—because they 
allow the average Joe to fulfill the American Dream of owning a home.  Sixty-eight percent 
of Americans own their own homes.  And the rate of Canadian homeownership?  It’s 68.4 
percent.”).   
 20. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN & RICHARDS, supra note 16 (“There is little evidence, how-
ever, that these tax cuts have had a positive impact on the stock market.  A recent study by 
three Federal Reserve economists found that these tax cuts did not raise the value of U.S. 
stocks.  Similarly, an analysis by the Urban Institute-Brookings Institution Tax Policy Center 
found that capital gains tax rates and stock market values have been only weakly correlated 
over time.”). 
 21. See, e.g., Sheppard, Ruby Slippers, supra note 8, at 1699 (“[Rep.] Neal’s bill 
also asks the larger question of why listed securities should ever pass tax-free in a section 
351 transfer.”).  
 22. See supra note 16. 
 23. See, e.g., Gene Amromin, Paul Harrison & Steven Sharpe, How Did the 2003 
Dividend Tax Cut Affect Stock Prices? 1 (Divs. of Research & Statistics & Monetary Affairs, 
Fed. Reserve Bd., Paper No. 2005-61, 2006), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
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The purpose of this Article is not to attack the decisions of Congress 
to promote investment or other socioeconomic goals.  Rather, there are por-
tions of the Code that appear at odds with the stated policy of Congress.24  
This often occurs when the Code has been applied to structures to which it 
was not intended.25  In the tax vernacular, this type of application is often 
referred to as “tax shelters” or “tax loopholes.”  When structures are estab-
lished specifically to avoid a Code section, with tax avoidance as their pri-
mary motivation, they are universally attacked by Congress and the Internal 
Revenue Service (Service).26 
When unintended consequences occur from an intended structure, the 
resulting anomaly is often cleared up with either legislation or rulings by the 
Service.27  Perhaps, Congress should have enacted a “subjective” Code pro-
vision that merely stated that if the tax structure provided the economic 
benefit of diversification, it is taxable.  This is similar to the subjective ap-
proach used by the “economic substance” criteria.  However, what happens 
when the anomaly is not corrected but rather acquiesced to?28  In the case of 
  
pubs/feds/2005/200561/200561pap.pdf (concluding that there was no finding of “any imprint 
of the dividend tax cut news on the value of the aggregate U.S. stock market”). 
 24. The Service has promoted various theories to attack these anomalies.  For exam-
ple, the “economic substance doctrine” is used as a counter argument when the form of the 
transaction meets the rules but the substance of the transaction is lacking.  See, e.g., Gregory 
v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469-70 (1935); Joseph Bankman, Articles and Essays: The Eco-
nomic Substance Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 5 (2000).  
 25. The tax shelters that unwound during the Enron period illustrate this point, in-
cluding the famous “Son of Boss” transactions.  In the “Son of Boss” transaction, an assets 
basis would be augmented through the partnership tax rules.  See John D. McKinnon & Jeff 
D. Opdyke, What Enron Means for Your Tax Return: IRS Crackdown Turns to Individuals in 
Wake of Accounting Scandals; Here’s How to Respond, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 2002, at D1, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1018304490631111160.html (“Clearly, the IRS 
is saying ‘We know you’ve been playing games,’ and now they’re out to stop it.” (statement 
of tax attorney Stefan Tucker)).  See also Press Release, IRS, Treasury Issues Guidance on 
Partnership Abuses (June 23, 2003), http://www.treas.gov/press/ releases/js493.htm (discuss-
ing the “Son of Boss” transactions).  
 26. See Sheppard, Ruby Slippers, supra note 8, at 1700 (“Greene Street’s, uh, in-
vestment objectives show the overwhelming tax-avoidance motive of its formation.”).  See 
also Beldore, supra note 18. 
 27. For example, the IRS publishes lists of Abusive and Listed Transactions on their 
web site.  IRS, Recognized Abusive and Listed Transactions, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/ 
corporations/article/0,,id=120633,00.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2010).  This is also a compi-
lation of the most aggressive tax shelters.  See generally McKinnon & Opdyke, supra note 
25. 
 28. Boss, supra note 14 (“Technically, exchange funds should be illegal.  There is a 
law preventing people from exchanging one security for a like security without paying taxes.  
There is also a general rule prohibiting investors from contributing securities to a partner-
ship—which is what an exchange fund is—in exchange for shares in the partnership when 
the whole purpose is stock diversification.”).  For example, in I.R.S. Notice 2001- 45, 2001-
33 I.R.B. 129 (Aug. 13, 2001), a similar basis shifting conceptual structure was disallowed 
by the Service.  In the notice, the Service identified certain redemptions of stock in transac-
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exchange or swap funds, there has been over fifty years of acquiescence.  
When a correction was proposed to this anomaly,29 the Joint Committee on 
Taxation stated that the rich would just find another way to avoid the tax30—
a rather strange position for the Committee to take. 
II.  EXCHANGE FUND BASICS 
In our current economic environment, one would not think that a di-
versification technique employed since the 1930s would be important.  
However, the current downturn of the market has created an environment in 
which techniques that historically were viewed as neutral or good are now 
favored.31  In reality, the downturn in the market has opened the market for 
  
tions not subject to U.S. tax in which the basis of the redeemed stock is purported to shift to a 
U.S. taxpayer as “listed transactions.”  Id. 
 29. Sheppard, Ruby Slippers, supra note 8, at 1699 (“[A] bill, H.R. 2705, [was in-
troduced] to further amend section 351, this time in a broader way than has been done in the 
past, to combat tax-free formation of swap funds.  Neal’s bill also asks the larger question of 
why listed securities should ever pass tax-free in a section 351 transfer.”). 
 30. Johnston, supra note 6, at C4 (“The Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation, 
without any supporting data, has written Mr. Neal to say that no revenue would be raised by 
closing exchange funds because ‘the class of investors engaging in swap funds’ would find 
other ways to avoid the tax.”).   
 31. See Sheppard, Ruby Slippers, supra note 8, at 1699 (“In spite of, or perhaps 
because of, the warning signs of a market downturn, the formation of swap funds and the 
avoidance of gain recognition on the contribution of appreciated securities has continued 
apace.”); Walter Updegrave, Danger: High Levels of Company Stock: Owning Your Employ-
er’s Shares in Your 401(k) Is a Huge Threat to Your Retirement. Keep it to a Minimum, 
MONEY MAG., Jan. 8, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/01/07/pf/expert/company 
_stock.moneymag/index.htm (“The problem is that once you get beyond a small holding of 
company stock—or the shares of any one company for that matter—you dramatically in-
crease the riskiness of your portfolio in two ways.  First, you expose yourself to the possibili-
ty that your company may simply implode along the lines of Bear Stearns and Lehman 
Brothers, decimating the stock’s value (and your 401(k)’s balance along with it) virtually 
overnight.  But even if that doesn’t happen, there’s another risk: heightened volatility.  A 
single stock is typically two to three times more volatile than a diversified portfolio.”); 
Shlomo Benartzi with Richard H. Thaler, Using Behavioral Economics to Improve Diversifi-
cation in 401(k) Plans: Solving the Company Stock Problem, UCLA ANDERSON SCH. OF 
MGMT, http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/x8065.xml (last visited Feb. 26, 2010) (“In the case of 
company stock, overconfidence could also be exacerbated by a ‘familiarity bias.’  When we 
know more about a company, we are more comfortable investing in that company, even if we 
have no real private information that would provide an investment advantage. . . .  Many 
investors fail to realize that the investment performance of a single stock is much riskier than 
that of a diversified portfolio.”); Paul J. Lim, Diversify! Diversify! (Yes, Even Now), N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 7, 2008, at BU7, available at http://www.nytimes.com 
/2008/12/07/business/yourmoney/07fund.html (“Only over time does diversification really 
show its worth.  For example, over the 10 years through November, the S.& P. 500 lost al-
most 1 percent a year, on average.  But a diversified portfolio of 40 percent S.& P. 500 
stocks, 25 percent foreign shares in the MSCI EAFE index, 25 percent in fixed-income se-
curities found in the Barclays Capital U.S. Aggregate Bond Index, and 10 percent in Trea-
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the exchange fund industry.32  For example, in the middle of one of the 
worst times to invest in United States history, Eaton Vance closed another 
exchange fund in October 2008.33 
“When most Americans sell stock they must pay taxes on their profits 
by the following April 15.”34  Exchange funds are sold to the wealthy as a 
means to diversify a single stock position without realizing current tax on 
that position.35  Investors will receive immediate diversification of their po-
  
sury bills gained nearly 2 percent annually, on average, according to T. Rowe Price.”); Jane 
Bryant Quinn, Diversify Your Investments Even If It Hurts: Jane Bryant Quinn, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, Apr. 22, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?sid=aX44el0YV2 
xk&pid=20601212 (“The best way to minimize your risk of investment loss is to own assets 
with low or negative correlations.”); Alan R. Feld, High Exposure To Low-Basis Stock: Too 
Much of a Good Thing?, CPA J., Nov. 1999, at 60, available at 
http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/d601199a.html (“Since even a ‘typical’ stock—a stock 
with an average arithmetic return close to the market’s—misses out on the smoothing effect 
of diversification, it’s likely to underperform the market as a whole.  In fact (Table 1[]), 
between 1970 and the end of 1998, a $1 million investment in the average single stock was 
sufficiently volatile to fall $18 million short of a market portfolio over the 29-year period.  
Furthermore, this heightened volatility is exacerbated when the investment environment is 
more difficult than usual.  The longer the bad patch, the more poorly the average stock is 
likely to perform relative to the market.”).  See generally Robert S. Bloink, Premium Fi-
nanced Surprises: Cancellation of Indebtedness Income and Financed Life Insurance, 62 
TAX LAW (forthcoming Spring 2010) (manuscript on file with the author). 
 32. See Sheppard, Ruby Slippers, supra note 8, at 1702 (“Congress can take comfort 
in the fact that like many troublesome transactions, the swap fund transfer is a bull market 
transaction.  When the bear comes, there will have to be statutes to prevent the selective 
recognition, transmutation, and preservation of capital losses.”). 
 33. Another example would be EBX IV, L.P., which closed at the end of 2008 with 
twenty-eight companies. EB Exchange Funds Home Page, http://www.ebexchangefunds.com 
(last visited Feb. 26, 2010) [hereinafter EB Exchange Funds]. 
 34. Johnston, supra note 6, at C1. 
 35. See, e.g., Sheppard, Ruby Slippers, supra note 8, at 1700; Beldore, supra note 
18, at 3; Citigroup Alternative Investments, http://www.smithbarney.com/products_services/ 
managed_money/cai/types.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2010) (“Exchange funds allow inves-
tors a tax-free means to diversify a low-cost-basis and/or restricted stock position.  Exchange 
funds allow investors to pool their low-cost-basis stocks in a fund.  In exchange for contri-
buting their stock to the fund, each investor owns a pro-rata share of the fund.  After a set 
period of time—generally seven years—investors can redeem their interest in the fund.  They 
will receive a non-taxable, distribution of a diversified pool of stock from the fund’s portfo-
lio.  The value of this distribution is equal to the net asset value of their pro-rata interest in 
the fund at the time of the distribution.  The stock distributed from the fund will retain in the 
aggregate the low cost basis of the stock originally contributed to the fund.  There is always 
the possibility that the U.S. tax code could change, disallowing the favorable tax treatment of 
exchange funds.  These changes could be retroactive, although this is believed to be unlike-
ly.”); Wilmington Trust, Single Stock Diversification Strategies, http://www.wilmingtontrust 
.com/wtcom/index.jsp?fileid=3000192 (last visited Feb. 26, 2010) (“The goal of an exchange 
fund is to allow an investor to shift from a concentrated position to a diversified position 
without triggering capital gains tax, as would be the case if the investor simply sold shares.”). 
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sitions.36  At the end of seven years, that investor will receive a bundle of 
securities with the same cost basis as the single stock position he or she 
contributed to the fund.37  Further, it is arguable whether this contribution is 
subject to the reporting rules, such as Rule 144.38  
Nonetheless, how large could this small carve-out actually be?  The 
largest Eaton Vance fund has over $16 billion under management.39  A 
transformation of the law would have a minimum tax impact of over $3 
billion on this fund alone.40  However, there are similar funds at JP Morgan, 
Bessemer Trust, and Goldman Sachs, among a few.41 
An interesting part of the discussion is the purported application of 
Sections 351 and 721 of the Code, discussed infra, to exchange fund forma-
  
 36. See Johnston, supra note 6, at C4 (“The confidential offering provided to The 
Times shows that investors have contributed to Eaton Vance’s exchange funds pool shares of 
more than 700 corporations, including almost every company in the Standard & Poor’s 
500.”); Boss, supra note 14. 
 37. See Boss, supra note 14 (“Seven years later, all the investors could withdraw a 
basket of stocks from the fund without paying capital gains.”); Johnston, supra note 6, at C1 
(“If investors stay in the pool for seven years, the stocks they get when they withdraw their 
investment do not incur the tax on investment profits that other investors must pay.  Only if 
the investors then sell the various stocks they received from the pool are they supposed to 
pay taxes.”); Toddi Gutner, Time to Swap ‘n’ Save? Exchange Funds Can Postpone Your 
Tax Bill, BUS. WK., Aug. 9, 1999, at 100, available at http://www.businessweek.com/1999/ 
99_32/b3641125.htm.   
 38. See Johnston, supra note 6, at C4 (“One of these people said he was also upset 
by advice in promotional literature for the Eaton Vance funds that shows executives how to 
disclose these transactions in a way that is legal but that investors who track sales by compa-
ny executives are less likely to notice.”). 
 39. See id. (“The Eaton Vance mutual fund company in Boston and the Goldman 
Sachs investment house are by far the biggest operators of investment pools based on this tax 
avoidance technique, with at least $18 billion of stocks in what are known in the investment 
business as exchange funds or swap funds.”); Boss, supra note 14 (estimating that in 2001, 
“more than $20 billion [was] tied up in exchange funds, according to industry accounts.  
Bessemer Trust’s four funds alone house[d] over $1 billion of individual investors’ stocks”).  
See also Ari Weinberg, Founders Get a Cure for the IPO Blues, FORBES, Sept. 13, 2002, 
available at http://www.Forbes.com/2002/09/13/0913funds.html. 
 40. The current long capital gains tax rates in 2009 is 15%.  See Section 112 of the 
Code.   
 41. See Johnston, supra note 6, at C4 (“Smaller exchange funds are operated by 
investment firms that include the Bessemer Trust, Credit Suisse First Boston, Merrill Lynch 
and the Salomon Smith Barney brokerage unit of Citigroup.”); Boss, supra note 14 (“Several 
major investment companies have orchestrated these funds, including JP Morgan (nyse: JPM 
- news - people), Goldman Sachs (nyse: GS - news - people), Eaton Vance (nyse: EV - news 
- people), Salomon Smith Barney, a unit of Citigroup (nyse: C - news - people), and Donald-
son Lufkin & Jenrette, a unit of Credit Suisse First Boston.  ‘It’s clearly targeting a certain 
profile of investor—that being the wealthiest,’ Henderson says.  Typically investors contri-
bute a minimum of $1 million in appreciated stock, which represents 10% to 20% of their 
holding.”); Gutner, supra note 37. 
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tion.42  As anyone who remembers basic income tax can attest to, the utiliza-
tion of these nonrecognition statutes43 is surprising in light of basic income 
tax principles.44  A typical Section 351 or 721 transaction is “a relatively 
small-volume transaction involving either the incorporation of an existing 
business by its owners or[, most commonly,] the establishment of a new 
business by a limited number of individuals desiring to combine their capi-
tal and skills.”45  The basic tax principle that applies to the contributions in 
these small start-up businesses is viewed as a mere change in form of con-
ducting operations of holding property.46 
For a shareholder to achieve the diversification that an exchange fund 
achieves, almost by definition, requires numerous shareholders since all 
shareholders are contributing single-stock positions.  Exchange fund forma-
tions involve hundreds of shareholders.47  In an exchange fund, each share-
holder “in exchange for one or a few appreciated securities, obtains a frac-
tional interest in a large diversified portfolio of which his former property is 
but a small part.”48  Most concerning is that these individuals are the weal-
thiest people who are not truly in need of this benefit.49   
Moreover, the participants in an exchange fund are “brought togeth-
er—perhaps ‘assembled’ is the better term—not by virtue of acquaintance, 
business contact or other element of previous association, but as a result of 
  
 42. BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, 4 FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, 
ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶ 91.2.2 (3d ed. 2003) (“This rule [351] is intended to preclude tax-free 
diversifications of investments by swap-fund exchange plans . . . .”). 
 43. A basic discussion of tax principles will be helpful in understanding nonrecogni-
tion.  The general rule is that a change in form of ownership of property will trigger tax.  You 
will both realize the gain or loss and recognize the tax effects.  The Code provides several 
exceptions to this rule.  Although the gain is realized, the taxpayer does not recognize the 
gain or loss for tax purposes.  Some common nonrecognition statutes are § 1031 for like-kind 
real estate transfers and the rules subject to this article. 
 44. Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 190. 
 45. Id.  See also Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(c)(7), Example (2) (as amended in 1996) (51 
transferors of mixed bag of stocks treated as diversification); Rev. Rul. 99-5, 1999-1 C.B. 
434. 
 46. This is commonly referred to as the aggregate view of partnership or corporate 
taxation. 
 47. For example, the Beldore fund anticipated over 100 shareholders.  See Beldore, 
supra note 18, at 78. 
 48. Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 190. 
 49. Under the Investment Company Act, the shareholder has to be a qualified inves-
tor with over $5 million and shares must be offered to only accredited investors as defined in 
Rule 501(a) of Regulation D of the Security Act.  See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(51)(A) (2006) 
(noting that a qualified purchaser is defined as (i) any natural person who owns $5,000,000 
or more in investments, (ii) any company that owns $5,000,00 or more in investments, (iii) 
any trust). 
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solicitation by promoters, brokers or fund management companies.”50  Then 
there is the issue of day-to-day control.  “[T]he investors lack day-to-day 
control over management” activities and, of course, “have no individual 
management responsibilities” since the fund is held by thousands of inves-
tors.51  In discussions regarding the intended uses of Section 351, a small, 
related shareholder group and active shareholder participation are normally 
referenced.52  However, these characteristics are missing in the formation of 
an exchange fund.53 
III.  TRADITIONAL FUND STRUCTURE 
Exchange funds were not the result of a specific grant of legislative 
authority.  Rather, they were “an accidental development—that is, an acci-
dent of skillful planning—and not the product of a conscious legislative 
determination to extend relief to investors ‘who feel prevented from diversi-
fying because of what they consider to be the excessive tax cost of selling 
appreciated assets.’”54  Therefore, the first question is: how are these funds 
traditionally structured.  This is especially important because the tax effects 
that result are a derivative of the form of the fund.   
An exchange fund is generally formed, by a promoter, as a Delaware 
limited liability corporation.55  The limited liability interests in the fund are 
divided into shares.56  The management, control, and operation of the fund 
are the exclusive responsibility of the manager of the fund.57  The fund is 
managed by a board of directors that generally appoints an Investment Ad-
visor.58   
Shareholders have limited rights regarding their interest in the fund.59  
Often, the shareholders do not have the right to replace the promoter as the 
  
 50. Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 190; See also BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, at 
¶ 91.2.2 (“[N]umerous unrelated individuals, solicited and selected by a promoter, transfer 
appreciated securities to a newly organized investment company in exchange for its stock.”). 
 51. Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 190; see also Beldore, supra note 18, at 1. 
 52. Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 190. 
 53. Id.  See also BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, at ¶ 91.2.2. 
 54. Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 185 (quoting Prospectus of Centennial Management 
and Research Corp. 3 (Dec. 23, 1960)). 
 55. See, e.g., Beldore, supra note 18, at 55.   
 56. Unlike a traditional small corporation strategy envisioned by Congress, “the 
[f]und may issue an unlimited number of full and fractional [s]hares.”  Id.   
 57. Compare this structure to the initial nonrecognition provisions under Section 
351(e) as enacted.  See infra Part IV.  Generally speaking, nonrecognition treatment was 
proper when, immediately after the contribution, the persons transferring the stock were in 
control of the corporation.  See Monte A. Jackel & James B. Sowell, Transfers to Investment 
Corporations: Complexity in a Conundrum, TAX NOTES 1659, 1660 (2002). 
 58. In the case of Beldore, the Investment Advisor is Boston Management and Re-
search, a wholly owned subsidiary of Eaton Vance.  Beldore, supra note 18, at 58.   
 59. See Beldore, supra note 18, at 55; Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 190. 
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manager of the fund.60  Additionally, shareholders have limited rights to (i) 
“consent to . . . changes in the investment objective[s] and the fundamental 
investment [goals] of the [f]und”; (ii) designate a new investment manager 
if the initial investment goes bankrupt and the initial promoter does not ap-
point a successor; (iii) commence a shareholder derivative suit brought by a 
shareholder; (iv) voluntarily terminate the fund in the event that assets under 
management drop below a predetermined threshold; and (v) appoint a liqui-
dator.61  The most telling statement related to the shareholder rights is as 
follows from the Beldore fund prospectus, “[s]hareholders will have no 
right to vote on, consent to or approve any action or matter relating to the 
fund.”62  In sum, shareholders are wholly passive investors in the fund.   
Since all decisionmaking authority vests in the manager, the manager 
of the limited liability company will play a crucial role.  The manager is 
always the promoter of the fund.63  The manager generally will turn over the 
investment decisions to the Investment Advisor.   
The Investment Advisor will hold two important roles.  The first role 
is as gatekeeper for the fund.64  He or she will decide which securities are 
worthy of being part of the fund.  The second role will be, after formation 
and close of the fund, as portfolio manager.65  He or she will decide when 
and if any of the securities will need to be sold and if any investment tech-
niques66 will be employed by the fund.  
Moreover, the manager charges significant investment management 
fees.67  The fees charged have two components: (1) the initial fee and (2) the 
annual fees.  Generally, these fees range from 1-2% of gross assets.68   
It is a two-step process to be accepted into the fund.  First, the investor 
must meet the initial vetting of the fund manager.  Then the investor must 
meet the vetting of the other investors. 
  
 60. See Beldore, supra note 18, at 55; Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 190. 
 61. See Beldore, supra note 18, at 55; Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 190. 
 62. Beldore, supra note 18, at 55. 
 63. In the case of Beldore, the Manager is Eaton Vance.  Id. at 55. 
 64. See, e.g, id. at 5. 
 65. See, e.g, id. 
 66. Investment techniques include a plethora of derivative trading techniques.  Bel-
dore includes, for example: 
using hedging techniques such as the purchase of put options, equity collars (com-
bining the purchase of put options and the sale of call options on the same equity 
securities), equity swaps, short sales of individual securities held, short sales of in-
dex or basket securities whose constituents are held in whole or in part, forward 
sales of stocks held and the sale of futures contracts on stocks and stock indices 
and options thereon.   
Id. at 2. 
 67. See, e.g, id. at 15. 
 68. See, e.g, id. at 14-15.  They charge 60 bps plus a service fee of 25 bps plus trans-
fer agent fees.  Id. at 15. 
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Generally, the process for vetting securities is as follows.  The inves-
tor will speak with the promoter and describe the securities.69  The promoter 
will then discuss with the Investment Advisor whether those securities meet 
the investment guidelines of the fund.70  The securities will also generally 
come from the big three exchanges (e.g., NYSE, AMEX, NASDAQ) with 
minimum share pricing and capitalization.71  If they are of the class of secur-
ities the Investment Advisor desires to balance the portfolio, then the fund 
will circulate the prospectus to the investor.72  Often, funds have a general 
theme.73  For example, in the 1990s there were funds for technology IPO 
offerings74 or there were high-tech funds.75 
If the securities meet the first test of acceptance by the Investment 
Advisor, then the shareholder will place the securities with an escrow agent 
“pending the exchange of the securities for [s]hares” in the fund.76  The se-
curities must meet the criteria of the other investors.  Before the fund offi-
cially closes, there is an inspection period of generally three to five days 
after a list of the securities and other investments is circulated among the 
  
 69. See, e.g, id. at 34. 
 70. See, e.g, id.  But cf. Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 187 (noting that the acceptable 
securities were “included in the fund’s prospectus”). 
 71. For example, Beldore requires stock price to be at least $10.00 with “an equity 
market capitalization of at least $500 million.”  Beldore, supra note 18, at 5, 34.  
 72. See, e.g., Beldore, supra note 18, at 5 (“Equity securities proposed for contribu-
tion to the Fund will be evaluated by the Investment Advisor and accepted or rejected based 
primarily upon the Investment Adviser’s view of how acceptance of such securities would 
affect the Fund’s ability to achieve its investment objective.”); EB Exchange Funds, supra 
note 33 (“EB will review hundreds of companies before accepting stock of about 25 compa-
nies into a fund.”). 
 73. David A. Twibell, Understanding Exchange Funds, FIN. ADVISOR, Nov. 2004, 
available at http://www.fa-mag.com/component/content/article/992.html?magazineID=1& 
issue=49&Itemid=73 (“‘Some funds, like Eaton Vance’s Belterra Fund, focus on building a 
portfolio of well-known large-cap stocks, while others like Merrill Lynch’s Montvale Fund 
lean more toward the mid-cap market.’ says Blake Flood, vice-president of investments at 
Atlanta-based Consolidated Planning Corp., an affiliate of Raymond James Financial Servic-
es.  ‘Other funds try to track major stock indices such as the Standard & Poor’s 500 or the 
Nasdaq 100.’”). 
 74. See Weinberg, supra note 39; EB Exchange Funds, supra note 33 (explaining 
that EB Exchange Funds create partnerships that enable entrepreneurs who are Accredited 
Investors to pool their pre-IPO stock). 
 75. See, e.g., White v. Alex Brown Mgmt. Servs., No. D049385, 2008 WL 324739, 
at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2008).  White was one of the original founders and President of 
Qualcomm and contributed his highly appreciated stock to the DB Alexander Brown Ex-
change Fund I.  Id.  When the Fund closed it had eighty-eight partners who contributed 
$152.5 million of securities.  Id.  See generally Cabaniss v. Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc., 611 
S.E.2d 878 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).  
 76. See Beldore, supra note 18, at 7. 
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prospective investors.77  During this inspection period, prospective investors 
can withdraw their subscriptions.78 
The exchange fund units will usually be redeemable at any time.79  If 
the redemption occurs within the first seven years following the contribu-
tion to the fund, the securities that the investor contributed will be distri-
buted.80  At the end of seven years, a basket of securities will be distributed 
to the investor.81   
Despite the promises of the fund managers, investors maintain risk 
within the funds.  In the late 1990s, exchange funds were quite popular 
among the tech industry.82  Alex Brown was one of the largest purveyors of 
funds.  At close of the fourth incarnation of the fund, eighty-eight investors 
contributed more than ninety different securities valued at over $150 mil-
lion.83  However, several years later, the value of the fund dropped substan-
tially.84  The problem that arose for the fund manager was the inability to 
protect against this downside risk.  In most funds, the managers set up the 
  
 77. See, e.g., id. (stating that the inspection period is “close of business on the third 
business day after distribution to Subscribers of the Inspection Report.”).  But see Chirels-
tein, supra note 8, at 187-88 (describing an inspection period of three weeks: “The ‘prelimi-
nary report’ permits the depositor to form a judgment concerning the investment merits of 
the portfolio, and he may (without cost) withdraw the securities deposited by him on notifi-
cation to the depository at any time within a period of three weeks following receipt of the 
report.”).   
 78. See, e.g., Beldore, supra note 18, at 7. 
 79. Section 704(c)(1)(B) of the Code provides that if appreciated securities contri-
buted by a partner are distributed within seven years after the date of contribution to anyone 
other than the contributing partner, the contributing partner will generally recognize a gain in 
the year of the distribution.  I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(B) (2006).  See Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 
189; Beldore, supra note 18, at 10. 
 80. See I.R.C. §§ 704 (c)(1)(B), 737 (2006).  See also Beldore, supra note 18, at 86 
(“To avoid the recognition of taxable gains by Investors in the Portfolio that have contributed 
securities to the Portfolio (including the Company), the Portfolio will not distribute appre-
ciated securities contributed by an Investor in the Portfolio to another Investor in the Portfo-
lio during the first seven years following contribution of the securities unless the contributing 
Investor in the Portfolio has withdrawn from the Portfolio.  Similarly, the Company will not 
distribute securities contributed by an Investor in the Company (including the Fund) to 
another Investor in the Company during the first seven years after contribution of the securi-
ties unless the contributing Investor in the Company has withdrawn from the Company.  And 
further, the Fund will not distribute securities contributed by a Shareholder to another Share-
holder during the first seven years following contribution of the securities unless the contri-
buting Shareholder has withdrawn from the Fund.”); id. at 10 (explaining that there will also 
be a termination penalty around one percent depending on the fund). 
 81. See Beldore, supra note 18, at 11. 
 82. Weinberg, supra note 39 (“Developed by San Francisco-based EB Financial 
Group, an exchange fund is essentially a private-equity fund exclusively for founders.”). 
 83. White v. Alex Brown Mgmt. Servs., No. D049385, 2008 WL 324739, at *1 
(Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2008); Cabaniss v. Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc., 611 S.E.2d 878, 879-80 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2005). 
 84. White, 2008 WL 324739, at *1; Cabaniss, 611 S.E.2d at 880. 
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funds with collars85 to “limit the upside and downside” potentials of the 
fund.86  However, in the early years of the fund, the appreciation of certain 
positions caused the renewal price of the collars to be excessive.87  The 
managers made the decision to remove the collars and capture that initial 
gain.88  Ultimately, the stocks experienced a sharp decline and, without the 
collar, a majority of the value of the exchange fund was lost.89   
IV.  TAX HISTORY OF EXCHANGE FUNDS 
Exchange funds have been in existence for decades, but came into the 
limelight in the 1960s.90  The statutes regulating exchange funds have been 
revised and reexamined by Congress through the years, but the tacit consent 
of the investment vehicle has nonetheless survived.91  In order to understand 
the current rules and carve-outs, it is important to briefly cover the evolutio-
nary saga of the current Code sections.  The trigger that allows exchange 
funds to operate is the application of the nonrecognition treatment of either 
Section 351 or 721 of the Code to the contribution of the securities to the 
fund.92  There are six main legislative periods that need to be addressed: (i) 
  
 85. Albert v. Alex Brown Mgmt. Servs., No. Civ.A. 762-N, Civ.A. 763-N, 2005 WL 
2130607, at *5 n.17 (Del. Ch. Aug. 26, 2005) (“‘Collaring’ is financial jargon for purchasing 
offsetting calls and puts on a security to limit upside and downside exposure.  At the incep-
tion of the Funds, the Managers attempted to limit upside and downside exposure to roughly 
10%.”). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at *5. 
 88. Id.  “The Managers then made the decision to remove the collars on the Funds, a 
decision that had beneficial effects in the short-term . . . .”  Id. 
 89. Id. at *5-6. 
 90. See Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 185; Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1659; 
Lee A. Sheppard, Rationalizing the Taxation of Exchange Funds, 95 TAX NOTES 152 (2002) 
[hereinafter Sheppard, Rationalizing]. 
 91. See Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1659 (“The first anti-swap fund legisla-
tion was enacted in 1966 to address corporate exchange funds. . . .  The swap fund saga 
continued its evolutionary pace in 1976 when, due to the removal of the non-tax impedi-
ments to the use of partnerships, the partnership exchange fund came into vogue. . . .  [T]wo 
decades later, in 1997, . . . the investment company statute was significantly expanded . . . 
.”); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE 
PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2001 BUDGET PROPOSAL 361 
(Comm. Print 2000) (“Congress has been aware of swap funds and has enacted legislation on 
several occasions to curtail their availability.”). 
 92. See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, at ¶ 91.2.2; Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 
184 (“Although the securities exchanged have substantially appreciated in value in the hands 
of the individual investors, the exchange is claimed to be non-taxable to the investors owing 
to the presumed applicability of Internal Revenue Code section 351 . . . .”); Sheppard, Ratio-
nalizing, supra note 90, at 152; Sheppard, Ruby Slippers, supra note 8, at 1699 (“Once again, 
the section 351(e) and section 721(b) limitations on the tax-free formation of investment 
companies have proved ineffectual and easily avoidable.”); Jerome M. Hesch & Elliot Man-
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pre-1966; (ii) the 1966 investment company statute and accompanying regu-
lations; (iii) the 1976 partnership legislation; (iv) the 1980 proposed regula-
tions; (v) the 1996 regulations; and (vi) the 1997 statutory amendment.  The 
first two periods deal with the nonrecognition provisions regarding corpora-
tions.  The last four periods deal with both corporation and partnership non-
recognition.  However, it should be noted that very few, if any, funds are 
currently structured as corporations.93  Most funds go out of the way to en-
sure that they will be treated as partnerships for tax purposes.94 
A. Pre-1966 Section 351(a)  
Section 351(a) of the Code provides that “[n]o gain or loss shall be 
recognized if property is transferred to a corporation by one or more persons 
solely in exchange for stock in such corporation and immediately after the 
exchange such person or persons are in control . . . of the corporation.”95  
Prior to 1966, investors would contribute appreciated stock to a company 
and utilize Section 351 for nonrecognition.96  In 1960, the Service issued a 
series of rulings that granted nonrecognition treatment under Section 351.97  
The Service ruled that upon the transfer of appreciated stock to an invest-
ment corporation, nonrecognition treatment would be applicable if the trans-
ferees were in control of the corporation post transfer.98   
As discussed above,99 the application of Section 351 to an arrangement 
that allows investors to obtain tax-free diversification does not appear to be 
a clean fit.100  Section 351 is traditionally applied to a start-up business.101  It 
  
ning, Partnership Investment Company Rules for Family Limited Partnerships, 22 TAX 
MGM’T EST. GIFTS & TR. J. 200, 200 (1997). 
 93. See Beldore, supra note 18, at 78 (“Were the Fund, the Company or the Portfo-
lio to be treated as a corporation rather than as a partnership for tax purposes, its income 
would be subject to federal corporate income tax at a current maximum rate of 35%.  In 
addition, distributions to Investors (or Shareholders, in the case of the Fund) would be cha-
racterized as dividends or otherwise treated as corporate distributions, and there would be no 
flow-through of items of income, gain, loss and deduction to Investors or Shareholders.”). 
 94. See, e.g., id (“The tax aspects discussed below depend, in large part, on the 
determination that the Fund, the Company and the Portfolio will be partnerships rather than 
corporations for federal income tax purposes.”). 
 95. I.R.C. § 351(a) (2006).  See also Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1660. 
 96. See Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 190-91; Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 
1660. 
 97. See, e.g., I.R.S. Tech. Info. Release 303 (Feb. 9, 1961); I.R.S. Tech. Info. Re-
lease 312 (Mar. 13, 1961); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 6205236350A (May 23, 1962); I.R.S. Priv. 
Ltr. Rul. 6104106310A (Apr. 10, 1961); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 6103249060A (Mar. 24, 1961).  
See also Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1660; Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 186. 
 98. Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1660.  
 99. See supra Part IV. 
 100. See Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 184-85,190. 
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is generally accepted that the rules in Section 351 are contemplated to apply 
where a few shareholders would start a business and contribute capital to 
the business.102  But by 1961, exchange or swap fund promoters were apply-
ing these rules to transactions involving thousands of shareholders who 
were assembled by a promoter.103  Moreover, these shareholders were turn-
ing over control of the corporation to the promoters and no longer managing 
the corporation on a day-to-day basis.104  These promoters were buoyed by 
the availability of IRS rulings substantiating their tax position and by the 
ceasing of IRS rulings either for or against the proposition.105 
In 1961, it had become evident106 that exchange funds were, in the 
Service’s view, an unintended consequence.  Thus, the Service issued a “no 
rule” position in Revenue Procedure 62-32.107  The Service was cautious to 
confine the applicability of its “no rule” position to transactions involving 
exchanges of securities or shares to newly formed investment companies 
“as a result of solicitation by promoters, brokers or investment houses.”108  
The Service’s interpretation of Section 351 appears to have applicability 
only to corporate formations where there was a prior association.109 
  
 101. See id. at 190 (“What is undoubtedly conceived of as typical of section 351 is a 
relatively small-volume transaction involving either the incorporation of an existing business 
by its owners or the establishment of a new business by a limited number of individuals 
desiring to combine their capital and skills.”); BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, at ¶ 91.2.1 
(describing Section 351 transaction as formation of a joint venture); BITTKER & LOKKEN, 
supra note 42, at ¶ 91.2.2 (“Section 351 does not apply to a ‘transfer of property to an in-
vestment company.’”). 
 102. See Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 190. 
 103. See id.; Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1660. 
 104. See Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 190; BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, at ¶ 
91.2.2; see generally I.R.S. Tech. Info. Release 303 (Feb. 9, 1961). 
 105. See Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 190; Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1660; 
BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, at ¶ 91.2.2; see generally I.R.S. Tech. Info. Release 303 
(Feb. 9, 1961). 
 106. Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 191 (“The suspicion [of misapplication of section 
351] grows stronger by reason of the circumstantial resemblance between fund formations 
and what former Commissioner Caplin has called an ordinary ‘marketplace exchange of 
securities.’” (citing Mortimer M. Caplin, Taxpayer Rulings Policy of the Internal Revenue 
Service: A Statement of Principles, 20 INST. ON FED. TAX’N 1, 23 (1962))). 
 107. Rev. Proc. 62-32, § 3, 1962-2 C.B. 527, 528.  See also S. REP. NO. 89-1707, 
reprinted in 1966-2 C.B. 1059; Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 191; Jackel & Sowell, supra note 
57, at 1660; BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, at ¶ 91.2.2. 
 108. Rev. Proc. 62-32, § 3.14(b), 1962-2 C.B. 527, 530.  See also S. REP. NO. 89-
1707, reprinted in 1966-2 C.B. 1059; Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 191. 
 109. Interestingly, the Service did not attack exchange funds directly on the “control” 
issue.  Section 351(a) requires the transferees to be in “control” of eighty percent of the out-
standing shares of the corporation after the transfer.  I.R.C. § 351(a) (2006).  In an exchange 
fund, although the shareholders held more than eighty percent of the equity, they did not in 
the pre-1962 form of entity have control over the entity.  They were more akin to a passive 
investor.  Yet, the Service never argued substance over form and attacked the pre-arranged 
transaction.  “In effect, the argument would be that the fund, having been formed initially by 
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On July 14, 1966, proposed regulations were recommended.110  These 
regulations provided that the exchange fund transaction would not qualify 
for nonrecognition treatment.111  Before the Regulations could be passed, in 
November of 1966, Congress enacted legislation, commonly referred to as 
the Foreign Investor’s Tax Act of 1966, subjecting exchange funds to taxa-
tion.112 
B. Foreign Investor’s Act of 1966 and 1967 Regulations 
The term “investment company” came into tax vernacular in the For-
eign Investor’s Tax Act of 1966.113  At the time, this was considered a minor 
“Christmas tree” tax bill.114  The legislation was directed at the nonrecogni-
tion provision of Section 351.115  Targeted transactions were those that re-
sulted in diversification of securities in a tax-free manner using Section 
351.116  Congress “limited nonrecognition treatment under section 351 to 
contributions to corporations other than [what are referred to as] ‘invest-
ment companies.’”117  Given the action and discussions leading up to the 
legislation, it was surprising that the legislation was silent regarding the 
operation of the new Section 351.118  In 1967, the Treasury promulgated 
  
issuance of a few shares to the promoter or fund management organization, thereafter simply 
distributed its stock to the public in a series of disconnected transactions which are not en-
titled to be viewed in the aggregate.”  Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 192.  The aforementioned 
series of transactions would then cause the subsequent shareholders to have exchanged their 
interests for a noncontrolling interest in the entity and thus create a taxable exchange.   
 110. S. REP. NO. 89-1707, at 61 (1966), as reprinted in 1966-2 C.B. 1102; Jackel & 
Sowell, supra note 57, at 1660. 
 111. S. REP. NO. 89-1707, at 61 (1966), as reprinted in 1966-2 C.B. 1102.  See also 
Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1660. 
 112. Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-809, § 203(c), 80 Stat. 1539, 
1577 (1966) (“The amendments made by subsections (a) and (b) [amending this section] 
shall apply with respect to transfers of property to investment companies whether made 
before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act [Nov. 13, 1966].”).  
 113. See id. § 203(b). 
 114. A Stop to the Swap?, TIME, Feb. 10, 1967, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,840854,00.html [hereinafter Stop to the 
Swap]. 
 115. See, e.g., T.D. 6942, 1968-1 C.B. 136. 
 116. Foreign Investors Tax Act § 203.  See also S. REP. NO. 1707 (1966), reprinted in 
1622-2 C.B. 1059. 
 117. Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1660.  See also Foreign Investors Tax Act 
§203; Stop to the Swap, supra note 114.  
 118. Stop to the Swap, supra note 114 (“Even in the vast and fast-growing mutual-
fund business, the swaps have had a remarkable rise.  The first was organized less than seven 
years ago by Denver Banker William M.B. Berger, 41, who had the bright—and right—idea 
that Section 351 (a), which had been drawn to allow the tax-free transfers of property to a 
new corporation in exchange for stock, could also apply to individual stockholders.”). 
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regulations that not only expanded the reach of the legislation, but actually 
limited it as well.119   
The term “investment company” was defined in the 1967 regulations 
broadly.120  The term “investment company” included121: (1) a regulated 
investment company (RIC);122 (2) a real estate investment trust (REIT);123 or 
(3) a corporation where the assets (excluding cash and nonconvertible debt 
obligations) were more than eighty percent of the value of the company.124  
The assets defined in the regulations at that time were “readily marketable 
stocks or securities, or interests in regulated investment companies or real 
estate investment trusts.”125  This became known as the “80% test.”  For the 
purpose of this threshold test, stock and securities in subsidiary corporations 
were disregarded.126  The parent corporation was deemed to own a ratable 
share of the subsidiary corporation.127 
Since there was no prior guidance, the Regulations had to define the 
most basic elements of the new term “investment company.”  For example, 
when was the 80% test to apply?  Immediately after transfer?  “The regula-
tions provided that the determination of whether a corporation was an in-
vestment company . . . should be made . . . immediately after the transfer in 
question.”128  Nonetheless, if there was a change following the contribution, 
which was “pursuant to a plan,” then the determination of investment com-
pany status was made on the date the plan was completed.129 
  
 119. See Rev. Rul. 67-122, 1967-1 C.B. 78. 
 120. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(c)(1)(ii) (1968). 
 121. See id. 
 122. See id.  See also I.R.C. § 851 (2006).  In sum, RIC must derive at least ninety 
percent of its income from dividends, interest, and capital gains.  Id. 
 123. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(c)(1)(ii).  See also I.R.C. § 856 (2006).  Generally, a REIT 
owns income producing real estate and distributes ninety percent of taxable income each year 
to shareholders as dividends.  Id. 
 124. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(c)(1)(ii). 
 125. Id.  See also Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1661; BITTKER & LOKKEN, 
supra note 42, at ¶ 91.2.2. 
 126. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(c)(4).  See also Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1661; 
BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, at ¶ 91.2.2. 
 127. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(c)(4). See also Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1661 
(finding that for the purposes of the regulations, a “subsidiary” corporation is one where “the 
parent owned 50 percent or more of (1) the combined voting power of all classes of stock 
entitled to vote, or (2) the total value of shares of all classes of stock outstanding”).   
 128. Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1661; Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(c)(2) (2009).  
See also BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, at ¶ 91.2.2. 
 129. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(c)(2) (2009).  See also Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 
1661; BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, at ¶ 91.2.2; Sheppard, Rationalizing, supra note 
90, at 152 (“It would be nice if all these inquiries about what is being contributed to the 
corporation or partnership were objective, but they are not.  Regulation section 1.351-1(c) 
asks a lot of questions about the parties’ intentions for the contributed assets.”). 
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The test for the purposes of the Regulation was whether diversification 
was achieved after the transfer.130  So, to some extent, the statute was li-
mited to only situations in which diversification131 took place.132  Further, if 
there was diversification, but only to a de minimis amount, this was disre-
garded for investment company purposes.133  The regulations included a 
step-transaction type analysis to determine if there was diversification for 
the de minimis rule.134 
C. 1976 Legislation Addressing Partnership—New Section 721 
By 1976, the investment world had changed.135  In 1966, exchange 
funds could only operate through a corporate form.  There were various 
state partnership problems and a myriad of securities restrictions that prohi-
bited the use of the partnership form.  Therefore, when the Foreign Inves-
tor’s Tax Act was passed, it only made changes to Section 351 regarding 
corporations.136   
However, as partnership rules changed in the early 1970s, exchange 
funds were being established in the partnership form.137  Almost a blow-by-
blow reoccurrence of the 1960 events happened with partnerships.  First, in 
1975, the Service issued a private ruling allowing investors to transfer the 
same type of appreciated securities to a partnership without recognizing 
current tax.138  In effect, the Service ruled that because there was no similar 
  
 130. See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, at ¶ 91.2.2. 
 131. For the purposes of the Regulations, diversification is the transfer, by two or 
more people, of nonidentical assets.  Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(c)(5).  See also Jackel & Sowell, 
supra note 57, at 1661; BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, at ¶ 91.2.2. 
 132. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(c)(1)(i).  See also Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 
1661; BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, at ¶ 91.2.2. 
 133. The example provided in the Regulations is that an amount of less than one 
percent (1%) of the total value of assets transferred would be “insignificant.”  Treas. Reg. § 
1.351-1(c)(5)-(7).  See also Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1661-62; BITTKER & LOKKEN, 
supra note 42, at ¶ 91.2.2. 
 134. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(c)(5).  See also Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1662; 
BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, at ¶ 91.2.2. 
 135. See generally STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 94TH CONG., GENERAL 
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976 655-56 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter 
GENERAL EXPLANATION]; S. REP. NO. 94-938, at 1 (1976); Hesch & Manning, supra note 92; 
Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1662. 
 136. GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 135.  As for treatment of partnerships pre-
1954 subchapter K, taxpayers had to rely on administrative and case law precedents.  See 
Helvering v. Walbridge, 70 F.2d 683, 684-85 (2d Cir. 1934). 
 137. GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 135, at 656 (“Recently, however, these 
difficulties were resolved and a number of public syndications were organized to sell ex-
change funds as partnerships.”). 
 138. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7504280550A (Apr. 28, 1975).  The Vance, Sanders Ex-
change Fund was granted tax-free status.  See also GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 135, 
at 656; S. REP. NO. 94-938. 
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prohibition to 351 in the partnership rules, this transfer was permissible, 
thereby opening the floodgates for pre-1966 diversification using the part-
nership form.139   
The ability to use the partnership form was more than merely a change 
of form to avoid the investment company rules under Section 351 for corpo-
rations.  As a partnership, the exchange fund did not incur taxes at the entity 
level.140  Items of partnership income, gain, loss, and deductions flowed 
through to the investors.  Conversely, if the exchange fund was treated as a 
corporation, it was subjected to the corporate income tax at current levels.141  
Additionally, distributions were characterized as dividends or otherwise 
treated as corporate distributions.142  Thus, there was no flow-through of 
income, gain, loss, and deductions to the investors.   
Congress concluded that the mere shift in form from corporate to part-
nership should not change the results.143  The diversification of assets, 
whether through contributions to a partnership or corporation, should not 
have tax-free treatment.144  Unlike in 1966, Congress attacked the partner-
ship version of exchange funds more squarely on the control issue.  “Con-
gress noted that, in the typical situation, even after joining an exchange 
fund, the investors generally did not want the managers to sell off either 
their own or other stocks . . . .”145  Congress differentiated between tradi-
tional partnerships where owners pooled assets and know-how in order to 
share risks in an ongoing business, and an exchange fund where partners 
were not sharing risk, assets, or know-how, but were merely using an in-
vestment vehicle jointly.146   
Based on this approach during the debates in Committee, it was fore-
seeable that Congress would enact a corresponding code section to 351 for 
partnerships.147  Congress thus enacted Section 721(b), which provided that 
the nonrecognition provisions of Section 721(a) of the Code no longer ap-
plied “to gain realized on a transfer of property to a partnership which 
would be treated as an investment company (within the meaning of section 
  
 139. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7504280550A (Apr. 28, 1975). 
 140. See Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1662. 
 141. See Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 188-89; Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 
1663; Beldore, supra note 18, at 78. 
 142. See Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 189; Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1663. 
 143. See GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 135, at 656; S. REP. NO. 94-938; Jackel 
& Sowell, supra note 57, at 1663.  See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 144. S. REP. NO. 94-938; Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1663.  See supra note 
134 and accompanying text. 
 145. Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1662.  See also GENERAL EXPLANATION, 
supra note 135, at 656; S. REP. NO. 94-938, pt. 11. 
 146. See Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1662.  See also GENERAL EXPLANATION, 
supra note 135, at 656; S. REP. NO. 94-938, pt. 11. 
 147. The 1976 legislation also enacted Section 683, which applied the investment 
company rules to trusts. 
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351) if the partnership were incorporated.”148  Moreover, once a partnership 
was classified as an investment company, the entity was prohibited from 
electing out of partnership tax classification under Section 761(a).149  
In the legislation, Congress also attacked corporate reorganizations 
that resulted in diversification.  Congress closed the loophole left after Sec-
tion 351 by enacting Section 368(a)(2)(F).  This prevented taxpayers from 
diversifying the appreciated securities through contribution to a wholly 
owned corporation and later merging that corporation with other corpora-
tions.150  There were significant differences between Sections 368(a)(2)(F) 
and 351 involving the calculation of the 80% test.151  At its heart, Section 
368 exempted reorganization transfers for entities that already held diversi-
fied portfolios.152  
D. 1980 Proposed Regulations 
Changes to the Regulations under Section 368(a)(2)(F)153 of the Code 
and an amendment to regulations under Section 1.351-1(c) were proposed 
by the Service.  The proposed regulations were designed to deal with trans-
fers to pre-existing entities.  For example, assume that there are two compa-
nies which hold one asset that is a single stock position.  If one company 
transferred 80% of the voting stock in exchange for 100% of the voting 
stock of the other company, would it qualify under Section 351?  Under the 
proposed regulations, this would not qualify.154  The distinction in the pro-
posed regulations would be that the de minimis rule would no longer apply.  
These proposed regulations were not finalized and were actually revoked in 
1998.155 
E. 1996 Regulations 
In 1976, when Congress promulgated Section 721 of the Code for 
partnerships and Section 368 for reorganizations, a broader definition of 
diversification was utilized.156  Under the Regulations for Section 351 in 
  
 148. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 721, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976). 
 149. See GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 135, at 658 n.6; Jackel & Sowell, supra 
note 57, at 1662. 
 150. See Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1662. 
 151. Id. at n.16. 
 152. See id. at 1663. 
 153. Investment Companies, 46 Fed. Reg. 1744, 1747-48 (proposed Jan. 7, 1981).  
See also Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1663. 
 154. Investment Companies, 46 Fed. Reg. 1744, 1746 (proposed Jan. 7, 1981).  See 
also Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1663.  
 155. See Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1664; Withdrawal of Proposed Regula-
tions, 63 Fed. Reg. 71047 (proposed Dec. 23, 1998). 
 156. See supra Section IV.C. 
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1967, a more stringent rule existed that resulted in diversification unless 
there was a de minimis transfer.157  In the early 1990s, the Service started to 
issue private letter rulings providing a case-by-case determination of wheth-
er diversification had occurred.158  Because the Service was no longer fol-
lowing the fixed approach under the earlier regulations, the area of de mini-
mis transactions became subjective.159 
In 1996, the regulations were amended to provide for an objective 
standard.160  The regulations provided that a contribution of diversified se-
curities to an entity would not result in diversification.161  As any estate 
planning attorney could attest, if one contributes a diversified portfolio and 
receives back a proportionate share in the company, there is no diversifica-
tion.162  The test for diversification is the same as in Section 368(a)(2)(F).163  
There is no diversification and thus nonrecognition “if not more than 25 
percent of the value of its total assets is invested in the stock and securities 
of any one issuer and not more than 50 percent of the value of its total assets 
is invested in the stock and securities of 5 or fewer issuers.”164 
F. Amendment of 351(e) in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 
As is often the problem with reactionary legislation, the Service and 
Congress acted before they had a full understanding of the complex finan-
cial instruments they were attacking.  The Service thought that exchange 
funds had gone by the wayside, even though that was not true.165  Therefore, 
in 1997, Congress added Section 351(e) to expand the categories of assets 
  
 157. See Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1661. 
 158. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9519003 (Jan. 31, 1995); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 
9518005 (Jan. 31, 1995); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9509010 (Nov. 30, 1994); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. 
Rul. 9451035 (Sept. 20, 1994); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9421014 (Feb. 23, 1994); I.R.S. Priv. 
Ltr. Rul. 9351031 (Sept. 28, 1993). 
 159. See Sheppard, Ruby Slippers, supra note 8, at 1700-01; Jackel & Sowell, supra 
note 57, at 1663-64; BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, at ¶ 91.2.2. 
 160. Transfers to Investment Companies, 60 Fed. Reg. 40794, 40794-96 (proposed 
Aug. 10, 1995).  See also Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1664. 
 161. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(c)(6)(i) (1999).  See also Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, 
at 1664. 
 162. See Hesch & Manning, supra note 92, at 204 (“Essentially, diversification oc-
curs if other family members (or any other investors) transfer different assets to the same 
partnership.  If two or more transferors contribute identical assets to a newly organized part-
nership, the pooling does not result in diversification.”).  Often in estate planning contexts, 
husband and wife would contribute the different securities to a joint account first, then trans-
fer their respective interests to the newly formed family partnership. 
 163. See Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1663-64. 
 164. I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(F)(ii) (2006).  See also Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 
1663. 
 165. For example, Beldore closed in October, 2008.  Beldore, supra note 18. 
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included in the definition of “investment company.”166  This was Congress’s 
attempt to stop the newest evolution of exchange funds.167 
The new Section 351(e) greatly expanded which assets would deter-
mine whether an entity, other than a RIC or REIT, would be classified as an 
investment company.168  Prior to 1997, the 80% test was limited to readily 
marketable securities, stocks, or interests in RICs or REITs.169  The newly 
expanded Act stated if more than 80% of the assets were:  
money; stocks [or] other equity interests in a corporation; evidences of indebted-
ness, options, forward or future contracts, notional principal contracts or deriva-
tives; foreign currency; some interests in precious metals; interests in REITs, RICs, 
common trust funds, and publicly traded partnerships; or other interests in noncor-
porate entities that are convertible into, or exchangeable for, any of the assets 
listed,170  
then the contribution would be subject to taxation.171  The question remains: 
why did Congress try to legislate away a loophole that easily could have 
been closed by prohibiting the diversification in total?172  
Upon the review of the legislative history, Congress merely limited 
the types of assets that could be used for the 80% test.  Congress did not 
override the existing regulations.173   
  
 166. Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1664; Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. 
No. 105-34, § 1002(a), 111 Stat. 788, 909 (1997); STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 
105TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN 1997 183 (Comm. 
Print 1997) [hereinafter 1997 LEGISLATION EXPLANATION] (“Of particular concern to the 
Congress was the reappearance of so-called ‘swap funds,’ which are partnerships or RICs 
that are structured to fall outside the definition of an investment company, and thereby allow 
contributors to make tax-free contributions of stock and securities in exchange for an interest 
in an entity that holds similar assets.”). 
 167. Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1664; Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 § 1002(a); 
1997 LEGISLATION EXPLANATION, supra note 166, at 183. 
 168. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF 
REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2001 BUDGET PROPOSAL 
361-62 (Comm. Print. 2000); Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1664-65. 
 169. Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1664. 
 170. Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1664-65. 
 171. I.R.C. § 1:731-2(c)(3)(i) (1996); Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1664-65. 
 172. See, e.g., Sheppard, Ruby Slippers, supra note 8, at 1701. 
 173. See Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1665 (“Specifically, the legislative histo-
ry states that the new statute does not override: (1) the requirement that only assets held for 
investment are considered for purposes of the definition; (2) the rule treating the assets of a 
subsidiary as owned proportionally by a parent owning 50 percent or more of its stock; (3) 
the requirement that a contribution of property to an investment company must result in 
diversification for gain to be recognized; and (4) the requirement that the investment compa-
ny determination must consider any plan concerning an entity’s assets in existence at the 
time of the transfer.”). 
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V.  TAX ANALYSIS 
Since the first reported exchange fund in 1960,174 Congress and the 
Service have been, through piecemeal legislation, attacking and narrowing 
the rules for these entities.  They have created a minefield of burdensome 
rules without directly attacking the root problem.  However, these rules are 
only an issue for the ill-advised.175  With a well thought out plan, these rules 
are easy to avoid.176  However, if a company fails the investment company 
tests, the penalty is high—gain recognition for all investors.177  Thus, one 
would expect to have a black-and-white result for contributions.  Clarity on 
how to navigate the rules in Sections 351 and 721 of the Code does not ex-
ist.  The following highlights some of the shortfalls of the current system. 
A. Financial Instruments and the 80-20 Rule 
As discussed earlier, Section 721(b) provides the general rule that gain 
is recognized where a transfer of appreciated stocks, securities, or other 
property is made to a partnership that would be treated as an investment 
company under Section 351 were the partnership a corporation.178  The de-
termination whether a partnership will be treated as an investment company 
is made under Section 351(e)(1).179   
Since the purpose of Section 351 is being abused by exchange fund 
promoters, congressional reactionary legislation continues to miss all the 
different financial instruments that can be used in place of prohibited assets.  
Given the patchwork approach Congress and the Service have taken to de-
cide which items are and are not securities, it is no surprise that the promo-
ters of exchange funds can either create or find financial instruments that 
are not addressed by the statute. 
  
 174. Stop to the Swap, supra note 114. 
 175. For example, the estate planner who triggered gain on the contribution of assets 
to a family limited partnership.  Hesch & Manning, supra note 92, at 200-01.  See also Shep-
pard, Rationalizing, supra note 90, at 152. 
 176. After all, that is the reason we have the rules.  As sophisticated tax professionals 
are given rules, they immediately think of how to avoid the rules.  See generally Sheppard, 
Rationalizing, supra note 90, at 152; Sheppard, Ruby Slippers, supra note 8, at 1700-01; 
Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1667. 
 177. See Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1667. 
 178. I.R.C. § 721(b) (1997).  See generally BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, at ¶ 
91.2.2; Beldore, supra note 18, at 79. 
 179. A partnership will be treated as an investment company if, after the exchange, 
over eighty percent of the value of its assets are held for investment and are “stock and secur-
ities” (or interests in real estate investment trusts or in regulated investment companies).  
Property covered by this gain recognition rule isn’t limited to stock and securities but in-
cludes eight categories of assets.  See Hesch & Manning, supra note 92, at 201; Beldore, 
supra note 18, at 79. 
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At the heart of the matter, financial instruments are merely contracts.  
There are two counterparties agreeing to terms.  Since the instruments are 
largely unregulated, they are easily manipulated.  The most basic example 
of manipulation of instruments is if the government was to prohibit the use 
of a put option.  However, a put option actually has two components: a 
knock-in and knock-out option.180  So, if an investor bought a knock-in and 
knock-out option, he or she is not violating the put option rules.181  Further, 
these instruments are merely contracts between a buyer and a seller.182  They 
are not regulated, and the other side of the contract (other than through tra-
ditional contractual remedies) might not be able to fulfill his or her obliga-
tion at close.183   
In the realm of exchange funds, there are often a lot of games played 
using “security-like” assets.  It is in the interest of the fund’s promoter to 
locate assets that provide stable returns with some level of liquidity but that 
are not classified as “securities” for the purposes of Section 351.184  Most 
often, fund promoters work around the term “evidences of indebtedness.”185  
Under Treasury Regulation Section 1.1275-1(d), the term “debt in-
strument” is “any instrument or contractual arrangement that constitutes 
indebtedness under general principles of Federal income tax law (including, 
for example, a certificate of deposit or a loan).”186  So, for the purposes of 
the aforementioned regulation, a “debt instrument” is an “evidence of indeb-
tedness.”187  
Even with all the congressional and governmental actions, there is no 
direct authority if “the term ‘evidence of indebtedness’ is limited to tradi-
tional debt instruments.”188  How would the Service consider a cash flow 
  
 180. See generally Peter Carr & Andrew Chou, Hedging Complex Barrier Options 
(New York University Working Paper 2002), available at http//www.math.nyu.edu/ re-
search/carrp/papers/pdf/multipl3.pdf; JON C. COX & MARK RUBINSTEIN, OPTIONS MARKETS 
(1985); George L. Ye, Exotic Options: Boundary Analyses, 15 J. DERIVATIVES & HEDGE 
FUNDS 149-57 (2009). 
 181. Carr & Chou, supra note 180; COX & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 180; and Ye, 
supra note 180. 
 182. Carr & Chou, supra note 180; COX & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 180; and Ye, 
supra note 180. 
 183. Carr & Chou, supra note 180; COX & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 180; and Ye, 
supra note 180. 
 184. See Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1672; Sheppard, Rationalizing, supra 
note 90, at 152-53. 
 185. See Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1669 (“‘Evidences of Indebtedness’ is 
not the only ambiguous phrase contained in the description of listed assets.”); BITTKER & 
LOKKEN, supra note 42, at ¶ 91.2.1. 
 186. Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-1(d) (1994). 
 187. See Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1669; BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 
42, at ¶ 91.2.3. 
 188. Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1669.  See also BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra 
note 42, at ¶ 91.2.4. 
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stream of rental real estate?189  What about viatical settlement contracts?  
The ambiguity harkens back to one of the fundamental problems related to 
exchange funds: investment company treatment.  If one is incorrect in his or 
her determination that an asset class qualifies, then the result will be in-
vestment company status.190  This will create a current tax for contributors. 
Most importantly, the traditional assets used in the exchange fund 
structure to satisfy the 80% test are interests in umbrella real estate invest-
ment trusts (UPREITs).191  Congress classified REITs as “securities” for the 
purposes of satisfying the 80% test in the investment company rules.192  As a 
result, the promoters turned to the REITs’ close cousin: the UPREIT.  A 
UPREIT is essentially a REIT with a lock-up.193  More specifically, 
UPREIT units are exchangeable, after a fixed period, into stock of the un-
derlying REIT at the election of the UPREIT holder .194 
It could be effectively argued that the UPREIT units do not pass the 
“evidence of indebtedness” test as they appear to be “readily convertible” 
into either stock of the REIT or money.195  On one hand, the exchange fund 
would argue that, given the lock-up, the units are not readily convertible 
until after the fixed period.196  The problem that arises is two-fold.  First, 
there is no definition of “readily convertible.”197  Second, Congress and the 
Service are unable to comprehend the difficulty in legislating against finan-
cial instruments.  These contracts can be manipulated with specific carve-
outs to meet any rule. 
  
 189. Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1669. 
 190. See Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1669; Sheppard, Rationalizing, supra 
note 90, at 152.  See also Beldore supra note 18, at 3-5. 
 191. See Beldore, supra note 18, at 3-5; Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1669. 
 192. I.R.C. § 351 (2000). 
 193. See Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1669; Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(d), Example 
4; Beldore, supra note 18, at 3-5. 
 194. Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1669.  Sometimes the conversion is into 
actual cash at the option of the REIT.  This would be even better for the exchange fund man-
ager as after seven years, they can convert readily to cash positions for the unwinding of the 
entity.  See id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. See id. (noting that there are “similar rules in the installment sale regulations 
under section 453.”  In Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-1(e)(5), an obligation is readily tradable if the 
obligation may be converted to a tradable security without a substantial discount.  “For this 
purpose, a ‘substantial discount’ exists if the obligation, when issued, is convertible for less 
than 80 percent of its current value.”  Generally, UPREITs are convertible at a one-to-one 
basis, and they have equivalent fair market values; thus UPREITs would seem to meet the 
aforementioned standard). 
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B. Timing of Investment Company Status 
“Treasury Regulation Section 1.351-1(c)(2) provides that the determi-
nation of whether a corporation is an investment company will ordinarily be 
made . . . immediately after the transfer.”198  However, when the investment 
blends or “circumstances change pursuant to a plan in existence at the time 
of transfer, the determination” will be made after the plan is in place.199  
Most funds have a requirement in the agreement that will ensure that more 
than 20% of the assets will be invested in Qualifying Assets.200   
There is no true guidance on determining what is or is not a plan in the 
context of Sections 351 and 721.201  In at least two other Code sections, 
there is guidance as to what constitutes a “plan.”202  More importantly, the 
Service often uses the term “plan” in arguing for application of the “step 
transaction doctrine.”203  When taxpayers attempt to skirt the technical ap-
plication of the rules through a literal interpretation, the Service takes the 
position that the series of steps will be integrated into one transaction.204  
  
 198. Beldore, supra note 18, at 80.  See also Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1665. 
 199. Beldore, supra note 18, at 80.  See also Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1665, 
1666-67; BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, at ¶ 91.2.2. 
 200. See Beldore, supra note 18, at 3 (“Separate from its investment in the Portfolio 
through the Company, the Fund will also invest in certain assets that must constitute at least 
20% of the Fund’s assets in order for the exchange of contributed securities for the Shares of 
the Fund to be non-taxable.”); Sheppard, Ruby Slippers, supra note 8, at 1700 (“Greene 
Street promises that at least 21 percent of the master partnership’s portfolio will consist of 
things that are not covered by section 351(e)(1)(B) . . . .”). 
 201. See I.R.S Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9013016 (Mar. 30, 1990) (responding to an inquiry 
where the partners contributed timber cutting rights, timber and timber land, and marketable 
securities to a partnership).  Partners had no plan to dispose of the timber and timber land for 
the next two years and no more than $500,000 of the timber would be sold within the next 
five years.  Service ruled that this was not an investment company.  Id.  See also Jackel & 
Sowell, supra note 57, at 1666; BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, at ¶ 91.2.2; Sheppard, 
Ruby Slippers, supra note 8, at 1699-1701. 
 202. See proposed regulations under Section 355(e) of the Code, which defines the 
phrase “plan (or series of related transactions)” broadly.  Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-7, 66 Fed. 
Reg. 66, 67 (Jan. 2, 2001).  While the regulations under Section 355(d) of the Code narrowly 
define “plan,” a “plan or arrangement” only exists if there are formal understandings.  Treas. 
Reg. § 1.355-6(c)(4) (2008).  See Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1666 n.51. 
 203. See Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1666. 
 204. The main step transaction theories are “binding commitment,” “mutual interde-
pendence,” or “end result.”  See Comm’r v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83, 96 (1968) (“[I]f one trans-
action is to be characterized as a ‘first step’ there must be a binding commitment to take the 
later steps.”); Am. Bantam Car Co. v. Comm’r, 11 T.C. 397, 405 (1948), aff’d 177 F.2d 513 
(3d Cir. 1949) (stating that factors to consider include the mutual interdependence and tem-
poral proximity of the acts); Kanawha Gas & Utils. Co. v. Comm’r, 214 F.2d. 685, 691 (5th 
Cir. 1954) (finding that the end result is a “series of transactions designed and executed as 
parts of a unitary plan to achieve an intended result”).  See also Jackel & Sowell, supra note 
57, at 1666. 
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Arguably, the overall requirement that the fund maintain a qualifying ratio 
of investments might be sufficient to meet the plan tests.205 
Regardless of how the Service would interpret the term “plan,” the 
question is whether this is a static determination.206  Is the determination 
made upon formation?  Is it made after the plan is to be completed?  Is it to 
be made each year?  It has been effectively argued by some that a better 
reading of the regulations is that taxpayers should analyze investment com-
pany status immediately after a contribution.207  In the case of an asset mix 
which changes over time “pursuant to a plan” (which exists upon contribu-
tion), any changes caused by the plan should relate back to the date of con-
tribution.208  Therefore, even though at times the entity is out of compliance, 
this is not fatal and can be cured. 
C. Tax Avoidance 
So what happens when tax practitioners apply certain sections to unin-
tended and unexpected situations?  Generally, the Service goes on the of-
fensive and attacks the problem.  For example, when tax practitioners were 
using Sections 358 or 752209 to shelter billions of dollars210 the Service acted 
  
 205. See Beldore, supra note 18, at 3 (“[T]he Fund will also invest in certain assets 
that must constitute at least 20% of the Fund’s assets in order for the exchange of contributed 
securities for Shares of the Fund to be non-taxable.”). 
 206. Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1666. 
 207. See Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1667.  See also Sheppard, Ruby Slippers, 
supra note 8, at 1701; BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, at ¶ 91.2.2; Treas. Reg. § 1.351-
1(c)(5) (2008). 
 208. See Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1667.  See also Sheppard, Ruby Slippers, 
supra note 8, at 1701; BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, at ¶ 91.2.2; Treas. Reg. § 1.351-
1(c)(5) (2008). 
 209. See I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, 2000-36 I.R.B. 255 (2000) (“The purported losses 
from these transactions (and from any similar arrangements designed to produce noneconom-
ic tax losses by artificially overstating basis in partnership interests) are not allowable as 
deductions for federal income tax purposes.  The purported tax benefits from these transac-
tions may also be subject to disallowance under other provisions of the Code and regulations.  
In particular, the transactions may be subject to challenge under § 752, or under § 1.701-2 or 
other anti-abuse rules.”). 
 210. I.R.S. News Release IR-2005-37 (Mar. 24, 2005): 
These arrangements purport to give taxpayers artificially high basis in partnership 
interests and thereby give rise to deductible losses on disposition of those partner-
ship interests.   
One variation involves a taxpayer’s borrowing at a premium and a partnership’s 
subsequent assumption of that indebtedness.  As an example of this variation, a 
taxpayer may receive $3,000X in cash from a lender under a loan agreement that 
provides for an inflated stated rate of interest and a stated principal amount of only 
$2,000X.  The taxpayer contributes the $3,000X to a partnership, and the partner-
ship assumes the indebtedness.  The partnership thereafter engages in investment 
activities.  At a later time, the taxpayer sells the partnership interest.  
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quickly and decisively to stop the abuse.  With the state of the economy, the 
need for additional revenues and the general policy of consistent application 
of the rules, the tax avoidance structure of swap or exchange funds needs to 
be addressed.  The issue has not been addressed in Congress since 1999 
when Representative Neal introduced a bill to amend Section 351.211  As a 
country, we are facing tough decisions, and to exempt from examination a 
loophole for only the wealthy would be an injustice.  In fact, the lead para-
graph from a Forbes Magazine article in 2001 was: “The trouble with loo-
  
Under the position advanced by the promoters of this arrangement, the taxpayer 
claims that only the stated principal amount of the indebtedness, $2,000X in this 
example, is considered a liability assumed by the partnership that is treated as a 
distribution of money to the taxpayer that reduces the basis of the taxpayer’s part-
nership interest under § 752 of the Internal Revenue Code.  Therefore, disregarding 
any additional amounts the taxpayer may contribute to the partnership, transaction 
costs, and any income realized or expenses incurred at the partnership level, the 
taxpayer purports to have a basis in the partnership interest equal to the excess of 
the cash contributed over the stated principal amount of the indebtedness, even 
though the taxpayer’s net economic outlay to acquire the partnership interest and 
the value of the partnership interest are nominal or zero.  In this example, the tax-
payer purports to have a basis in the partnership interest of $1,000X (the excess of 
the cash contributed ($3,000X) over the stated principal amount of the indebted-
ness ($2,000X)).  On disposition of the partnership interest, the taxpayer claims a 
tax loss with respect to that basis amount, even though the taxpayer has incurred no 
corresponding economic loss.  
In another variation, a taxpayer purchases and writes options and purports to 
create substantial positive basis in a partnership interest by transferring those op-
tion positions to a partnership.  For example, a taxpayer might purchase call op-
tions for a cost of $1,000X and simultaneously write offsetting call options, with a 
slightly higher strike price but the same expiration date, for a premium of slightly 
less than $1,000X.  Those option positions are then transferred to a partnership 
which, using additional amounts contributed to the partnership, may engage in in-
vestment activities.  
Under the position advanced by the promoters of this arrangement, the taxpayer 
claims that the basis in the taxpayer’s partnership interest is increased by the cost 
of the purchased call options but is not reduced under § 752 as a result of the part-
nership’s assumption of the taxpayer’s obligation with respect to the written call 
options.  Therefore, disregarding additional amounts contributed to the partnership, 
transaction costs, and any income realized and expenses incurred at the partnership 
level, the taxpayer purports to have a basis in the partnership interest equal to the 
cost of the purchased call options ($1,000X in this example), even though the tax-
payer’s net economic outlay to acquire the partnership interest and the value of the 
partnership interest are nominal or zero.  On the disposition of the partnership in-
terest, the taxpayer claims a tax loss ($1,000X in this example), even though the 
taxpayer has incurred no corresponding economic loss. 
The Internal Revenue Service announced today that taxpayers participating in 
the Son of Boss tax shelter settlement have so far paid in more than $3.2 billion, a 
figure that should top $3.5 billion when the project concludes in coming months. 
Id. 
 211. H.R. 2705, 106th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999).  
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pholes is that the better they are, the better the chance they’ll be closed.  For 
years now, lawmakers have been trying to do away with exchange funds, 
also known as ‘swap funds,’ which allow holders of highly appreciated 
stock to diversify without paying capital gains taxes.”212  Yet, here we are in 
2009 with the “loophole” in full force. 
Moreover, it appears that the approach advocated by Representative 
Neal equates swap or exchange funds with other types of hedging transac-
tions taxpayers can enter into without current taxation.213  For example, a 
taxpayer with a single stock position in Exxon can execute a “costless col-
lar” on the stock by buying a put and a call on the security.214  Costless col-
lars can be established to fully protect existing long stock positions with 
little or no cost since the premium paid for the protective puts is offset by 
the premiums received for writing the covered calls.215  Depending on the 
volatility of the underlying stock, the call strike can range from 30% to 70% 
out of money, enabling the writer of the call to still enjoy a limited profit 
should the stock price rise.216  The second step to the “collar” strategy is 
then to borrow against the fixed position.217  The end result of the “collar” 
strategy is similar to an exchange fund: an investor would have cash in or-
der to diversify his or her position.  
However, the fundamental difference between the two strategies is the 
limitation placed on the time horizon of a derivative option compared to the 
exchange fund.  The future horizon of a covered call position is generally 
five years.  Therefore, at the end of the five-year period, if the underlying 
security significantly decreased or increased in price and did not stay within 
its range of the collar, the cost of replacing the collar becomes prohibitive.  
  
 212. Boss, supra note 14.  
 213. See Sheppard, Ruby Slippers, supra note 8, at 1701. 
 214. A “costless collar” is the purchase of a put on the stock exercisable in the future 
with the simultaneous writing of an out-of-the money covered call option with a strike price 
which is equal to the premium of the put option.  See generally Beldore, supra note 18, at 41-
42; Barnet Phillips, IV, Exchange Funds: What Is Diversification?, 838 PLI/TAX 583, 611 
(2007); Erika W. Nijenhuis, William L. McRae & Elena V. Romanova, Everything I Know 
About New Financial Products I Learned From DECS, 850 PLI/TAX 129, 179 (2008); Law-
rence D. Cavanagh, Hedging Your Stock With Collars, VALUE LINE OPTIONS, 
http://www.valueline.com/edu_options/rep13.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2009); The Options 
Guide, Costless Collar (Zero-Cost Collar), http://www.theoptionsguide.com/costless-
collar.aspx (last visited Oct. 15, 2009). 
 215. See generally Beldore, supra note 18, at 41-42; Cavanagh, supra note 214; 
Wilmington Trust, Costless Collars: Protecting the Value of Your Securities, 
http://www.wilmingtontrust.com/wtcom/index.jsp?fileid=3000206 (last visited Oct. 15, 
2009). 
 216. See generally Beldore, supra note 18, at 41-42; Cavanagh, supra note 214; 
Wilmington Trust, supra note 215. 
 217. See Beldore, supra note 18, at 41-42; Wilmington Trust, supra note 215 (“[I]n 
this case, the lender might be able to lend up to 80% to 90% of the put strike price.”). 
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For example, assume that Exxon was at $25 a share when the collars were 
placed on the stock.  The collars lasted five years.  At the end of the five-
year period, if Exxon was worth $5 a share, then the collars did what they 
were supposed to do, they protected the wealth.218 
How is an exchange fund any different than a tax shelter or allowing 
hedge fund managers to defer paying billions of dollars?219  If one believes 
that there are similarities, then it is easy to envision a similar chain of events 
unfolding as took place in the hedge fund industry.  The hedge fund indus-
try went through its public offering bonanza during 2007.220  This spurred 
Congress to begin “focus[ing] on the tax loopholes allowing these owner-
individuals to monetize their carried interest at a significantly reduced 
tax.”221   
The argument for maintaining the current legislative rules is that after 
over fifty years222 if they truly were a cause for concern, then legislation 
would have been enacted.  However, there is very little if anything written 
on the subject.223  Why would a multibillion-dollar industry have so little 
guidance? 
In fact, there have been no congressional hearings or press on the me-
rits of changing the law.  There have been no hearings since Representative 
Neal’s proposed legislation in 1999.  In today’s environment, one would 
expect that the arguments should center on the question of the fundamental 
fairness for a perceived tax preference for the wealthy.  Assuming that Con-
  
 218. Collars also have other risks such as SEC reporting rules including volume 
limitation sale rules.  See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144.  Also, desired tax results are not specifically 
confirmed by Treasury Regulations.   
 219. See generally David J. Herzig, Carried Interest: Can They Effectively Be 
Taxed?, 4 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 23 (2009). 
 220. See, e.g., Fortress Investment Group LLC, Registration Statement (Form S-1) 
(Nov. 8, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1380393/000095013 
606009310/file1.htm. 
 221. Herzig, supra note 219, at 25.  See also David Cho, Blackstone IPO Faces 
Roadblock in Senate, WASH. POST, June 15, 2007, at D1 (“Publicly traded partnerships are 
rare, especially in the financial sector.  The senators expressed concern that Blackstone’s 
offering would set a dangerous precedent and lead to a wave of financial firms reorganizing 
themselves to take advantage of the tax loophole.”); Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Black-
stone Proves Carried Interests Can Be Valued, 115 TAX NOTES 1236, 1237 (2007) [hereinaf-
ter Sheppard, News Analysis] (finding that the structuring in the Fortress and Blackstone 
initial public offerings created basis increases and tax savings not previously available). 
 222. See Stop to the Swap, supra note 114 (The first swap fund is attributed in 1960 
to Denver Banker William M.B. Berger.  He “had the bright—and right—idea that Section 
351(a), which had been drawn to allow the tax-free transfer of property to a new corporation 
in exchange for stock, could also apply to individual stockholders.  His Centennial Fund 
drew 191 investors, who pooled securities worth $25,800,000. Berger’s idea has been widely 
copied.  Boston’s Vance, Sanders & Co. operates four funds currently worth $311.2 mil-
lion.”). 
 223. See Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1660. 
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gress desires to change the current law, as evidenced by the President’s re-
cent rhetoric,224 the focus should be on the most effective solution. 
Exchange funds are established for the purpose of avoiding investment 
company status.225  The promoter of the fund sets up an entity with a prede-
termined set of assets at 80% marketable securities and 20% illiquid in-
vestments within the definition of either Section 351 or 721 depending on 
the type of entity.226  The question that begs to be asked is: Why are these 
entities allowed to be formed for the primary purpose of avoiding invest-
ment company status?227   
Treasury Regulations Section 1.701-2 provides that “if a partnership is 
formed or availed of in connection with a transaction a principal purpose of 
which is to reduce substantially the present value of the partners’ aggregate 
federal [income] tax liability in a manner that is inconsistent with the intent” 
of the partnership provision of the Code, the Service has the authority to re-
characterize the transaction.228  The Service can preclude the tax benefits 
sought under this authority.229  Further, the investment company rules for 
reorganizations, Section 368(a)(2)(F), permits “ignor[ing] assets acquired 
for the purpose of ceasing to be an investment company.”230 
The promoters/proponents of the exchange funds argue that the 
aforementioned rules should not apply.231   
Tax counsel does not believe that treating a contribution of securities to a partner-
ship as not currently taxable when the partnership does not come within the in-
vestment company definition expressly approved by Congress when it amended 
  
 224. See Obama for America, supra note 11. 
 225. See, e.g., Sheppard, Ruby Slippers, supra note 8, at 1700 (“Greene Street’s, uh, 
investment objectives show the overwhelming tax-avoidance motive of its formation.”); 
Beldore, supra note 18, at 3 (“The Fund will also invest in certain assets that must constitute 
at least 20% of the Fund’s assets in order for the exchange of contributed securities for 
Shares of the Fund to be non-taxable . . . .”). 
 226. See, e.g., Sheppard, Ruby Slippers, supra note 8, at 1700; Beldore, supra note 
18, at 3. 
 227. The question has been asked and not answered before.  See Sheppard, Ruby 
Slippers, supra note 8, at 1700-02; Sheppard, Rationalizing, supra note 90; Johnston, supra 
note 6.  
 228. Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2 (2009).  See also Hesch & Manning, supra note 92, at 209 
(“As a general proposition, because the investment company regulations comprehensively 
deal with transfers of securities to partnerships, the anti-abuse regulations should not apply 
when the family partnership arrangement is designed to void the specific provisions of 
§721(b).”). 
 229. Under Treasury Regulation section 1.701-2, the service has outlawed many 
schemes, including tax shelters.  See, e.g., Jade Trading, LLC v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 11 
(2007); Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, LLC v. United States, 440 F. Supp. 2d 608 (E.D. Tex. 
2006). 
 230. See Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1667-68.  See I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(F)(iv) 
(2006). 
 231. See Beldore, supra note 18, at 80. 
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Code Section 351(e) in 1997 would be found to be inconsistent with the intent of 
the partnership provisions of the Code.232  
This position, amazing as it may appear, seems to be supported by the Ser-
vice. 
In Private Letter Ruling 200017051, the Service took the position that 
when assets were “transferred to a partnership for the sole or primary pur-
pose of avoiding investment company status,” it was permissible.233  After 
the death of the decedent, the family went through an overall reorganization 
of its assets.234  Three trusts transferred various interests including marketa-
ble securities, promissory notes, and real estate interests, to a limited part-
nership.235  The real estate interests were held in limited liability companies 
(LLCs).236  The Service looked through the LLCs to the underlying assets 
and concluded that the qualifying assets were greater than 20%.237  Thus, the 
partnership did not qualify as an investment company.238  The ruling did not 
opine on the use of the LLC interests solely to avoid qualifying for invest-
ment company status.239  However, the ruling did not negate that the only 
reason for qualifying was the basket of interests that the family put together.   
As discussed supra, in most sophisticated exchange funds, there is a 
strong correlation between the 20% illiquid portion and the promoter of the 
fund.240  For example, in the Eaton Vance fund, the qualifying assets are part 
of a newly formed real estate investment trust that is owned and operated by 
the promoter.241  This is a similar structure to PLR 200017051.  However, it 
seems disingenuous to state that this is any different than a Section 368 re-
organization.  The promoter set up an entity other than to accomplish a sin-
gular tax objective.242  The promoter even went so far as to establish the 
illiquid portion of the fund and exercise control over that asset to allow the 
investor a further level of comfort.243  
Why do the Service and Congress allow exchange funds to follow the 
letter of the Code here when the underlying premise of an exchange fund 
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fails?  Section 351 of the Code was never designed to apply to these types 
of entities.  To argue that the fund fits within the intent of the Code for tax 
avoidance one has to accept that the fund fails to meet the intent of the Code 
in formation.   
VI.  ADDITIONAL BENEFITS 
It would have been expected that having a congressionally authorized 
diversification tool would have been sufficient for the fortunate few who 
held a security that the promoter of the exchange fund desired.244  However, 
as is often the case with advantageous tax laws, the beneficiary of the ac-
cumulated advantage continues to look for further benefits.   
A. Estate Planning 
In the realm of exchange funds, the contributors continue to strain the 
tax system by often employing estate tax strategies.245  One of the most 
common estate planning techniques is the “estate freeze.”246  An interesting 
aspect of the exchange fund is that not only is this type of a transaction con-
templated, but it is also often specifically provided for in the limited liability 
company agreement.247  For example, in one prospectus, a shareholder may 
divide his or her shares into a preferred component and a common compo-
nent.248  In that fund, the preferred shares are the current value of the stock 
and the common shares are the growth over the preferred.249  Why would 
this be part of the agreement if it were not often utilized?  In fact, the pro-
moter of the exchange fund will use this as a selling point of the fund.  Not 
only does the shareholder gain the tax advantage of tax-free diversification, 
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but he or she gets tax savings at death.  So the shareholder gets to “cheat” 
the system twice.  
Finally, even without using the aforementioned technique, upon death 
of a shareholder, the tax basis of the shareholder’s interest in the exchange 
fund generally will be increased or decreased to the fair market value of 
such interest at the date of death.250  The step-up in basis will be subject to 
the prescribed limits in 2010.251   
B. Borrowing Against the Fund 
The argument put forth by the Committee for Joint Taxation, which 
dismissed Representative Neal’s proposed legislation in 1999, was that even 
if the law was changed, the wealthy would find alternatives that allowed the 
same tax-free diversification.252  “The Congressional Joint Committee on 
Taxation, without any supporting data, has written [Representative] Neal to 
say that no revenue would be raised by closing exchange funds because ‘the 
class of investors engaging in swap funds’ would find other ways to avoid 
the tax.”253  What the Committee failed to discuss was that not only were the 
potential investors of the exchange fund utilizing the vehicles for tax-free 
diversification, but they were also borrowing out their original basis.254  In 
effect, the potential investors would receive the best of both worlds.   
Part of the selling point of the exchange fund is the ability to make 
distributions to an investor of his or her original basis.255  Thus, assume that 
the investor has $5 million of XYZ corporation, a publicly traded NYSE 
stock.  The investor paid (has a basis) of $1 million in the stock.  The ex-
change fund promotes the following scenario to the investor—put in $5 
million and at the end of seven years the fund will deliver a diversified port-
folio of securities.  Further, if the investor elects, over a three-year period, 
the fund will allow him or her to borrow out of the fund his or her original 
basis—in this case $1 million.  At the end of the seven-year period, the in-
vestor would have a tax-free diversified portfolio and the ability to have 
invested the $1 million outside of the fund.256   
When the Committee said that the investors would find another way to 
avoid tax, it was correct.  The wealthy not only have continued to invest in 
the funds, but they have avoided the additional taxation that would normally 
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exist in a borrowing situation and continue to maximize their tax-free 
growth. 
CONCLUSION 
The underlying fact that must finally be accepted is that exchange 
funds exist only for the purpose of avoiding taxation.  Every part of the ex-
change fund is designed around a specific rule.  The term of the fund, set at 
seven years, is designed to avoid Section 704(c)(1)(B).  The 80%–20% asset 
breakdown exists only to avoid the investment company rules under Sec-
tions 351 or 721.  The 20% illiquid security is specifically engineered for 
the fund to satisfy the tax code. 
What is unclear is why Congress continues to allow this tax shelter to 
exist.  Each time that legislation has been brought to the forefront, it has 
been dismissed in committee.  Part of the problem is that no one really 
knows the extent of the industry.  Another part of the problem is that it has 
the veneer of legitimacy.  By having large financial institutions promote 
these funds and large law firms support the tax conclusions, investors do not 
question whether or not they are legitimate.  However, when one sees that 
over $30 billion is invested in these funds, and considers the sophisticated 
investor rules, it becomes apparent that the wealthy remain the only benefi-
ciaries of these investments, and there is no tax in sight.  These rules should 
be reexamined.   
Rather than following the Joint Committee on Taxation’s advice to 
Representative Neal in his 1996 legislative proposal, and ignoring the prob-
lem because the rich will just find another way, there are two solutions to 
the enigma of exchange funds.  The first solution is to merely change the 
rules in Sections 351 and 721 of the Code to prohibit the formation of these 
exchange funds.  The current laundry-list approach must be eliminated.  The 
ability of the financial markets to create security line instruments is unsur-
passed.  Congress and the treasury are unable to keep pace.  Thus, the fun-
damental rules must be changed.  Moreover, given the apparent misapplica-
tion of the underlying statutes, this does not appear to be an unreasonable 
approach. 
There is also an intermediate attack on the exchange funds.  Treasury 
can use the anti-abuse rules in Treasury Regulations Section 1.701-2 to pro-
hibit the formation of these entities.  There exists no apparent reason for the 
current acquiescence to this structure.  The stated purpose of the exchange 
fund is to avoid taxation.  Treasury should use the anti-abuse regulations to 
prevent exchange funds from being solely formed for tax avoidance. 
